[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <3d2e3792-e78e-95a8-623e-1ddcf3ccf241@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 19:07:55 -0800
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: Eric Richter <erichte@...ux.ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@...abs.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@...abs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@...ula.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@...ux.ibm.com>,
George Wilson <gcwilson@...ux.ibm.com>,
Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@...ibm.com>,
Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@...il.com>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access
secure variable
On 11/5/2019 12:24 AM, Eric Richter wrote:
> From: Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>
>
> The X.509 certificates trusted by the platform and required to secure boot
> the OS kernel are wrapped in secure variables, which are controlled by
> OPAL.
>
> This patch adds firmware/kernel interface to read and write OPAL secure
> variables based on the unique key.
I feel splitting this patch into smaller set of changes would make it
easier to review. For instance roughly as below:
1, opal-api.h which adds the #defines OPAL_SECVAR_ and the API signature.
2, secvar.h then adds secvar_operations struct
3, powerpc/kernel for the Interface definitions
4, powernv/opal-secvar.c for the API implementations
5, powernv/opal-call.c for the API calls
6, powernv/opal.c for the secvar init calls.
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
> index 378e3997845a..c1f25a760eb1 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/opal-api.h
> @@ -211,7 +211,10 @@
> #define OPAL_MPIPL_UPDATE 173
> #define OPAL_MPIPL_REGISTER_TAG 174
> #define OPAL_MPIPL_QUERY_TAG 175
> -#define OPAL_LAST 175
> +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET 176
> +#define OPAL_SECVAR_GET_NEXT 177
> +#define OPAL_SECVAR_ENQUEUE_UPDATE 178
> +#define OPAL_LAST 178
Please fix the indentation for the #defines
> +static int opal_get_variable(const char *key, uint64_t ksize,
> + u8 *data, uint64_t *dsize)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!key || !dsize)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + *dsize = cpu_to_be64(*dsize);
> +
> + rc = opal_secvar_get(key, ksize, data, dsize);
> +
> + *dsize = be64_to_cpu(*dsize);
Should the return status (rc) from opal_secvar_get be checked before
attempting to do the conversion (be64_to_cpu)?
> +static int opal_get_next_variable(const char *key, uint64_t *keylen,
> + uint64_t keybufsize)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!key || !keylen)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + *keylen = cpu_to_be64(*keylen);
> +
> + rc = opal_secvar_get_next(key, keylen, keybufsize);
> +
> + *keylen = be64_to_cpu(*keylen);
Same comment as above - should rc be checke before attempting to convert?
> +
> + return opal_status_to_err(rc);
> +}
> +
> +static int opal_set_variable(const char *key, uint64_t ksize, u8 *data,
> + uint64_t dsize)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + if (!key || !data)
> + return -EINVAL;
Is the key and data received here from a trusted caller? If not, should
there be some validation checks done here before enqueuing the data?
-lakshmi
Powered by blists - more mailing lists