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Message-ID: <5833c75e-9f3e-0412-d58c-b6cabdfbdaee@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2019 10:41:17 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
x86@...nel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Liran Alon <liran.alon@...cle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] KVM: x86: tell guests if the exposed SMT topology is
trustworthy
On 06/11/19 09:32, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>> The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the
>>> vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.
>>
>> This is a subset of the requirements for "trustworthy" SMT. You can have:
>>
>> - vCPUs pinned to two threads in the same core and exposed as multiple
>> cores in the guest
>
> Why the .... would one do anything like that?
If a vCPUs from a different guest could be pinned to a threads in the
same core as this guest (e.g. guests with an odd number of vCPUs), then
why not. Side-channel wise, you're screwed anyway.
>> - vCPUs from different guests pinned to two threads in the same core
>>
>> and that would be okay as far as KVM_HINTS_REALTIME is concerned, but
>> would still allow exploitation of side-channels, respectively within the
>> VM and between VMs.
>
> Hardly, RT really rather would not have SMT. SMT is pretty crap for
> determinism.
True, but not a problem as long as the guest knows that - it can ignore
one sibling for each core for RT tasks, and use hyperthreading for
non-RT and housekeeping tasks.
Paolo
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