linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] kasan: detect negative size in memory operation function

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Date:   Mon, 11 Nov 2019 12:29:51 +0300
From:   Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>
To:     Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
Cc:     Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@...il.com>,
        kasan-dev@...glegroups.com, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        wsd_upstream <wsd_upstream@...iatek.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] kasan: detect negative size in memory operation
 function



On 11/11/19 10:14 AM, Walter Wu wrote:
> On Sat, 2019-11-09 at 01:31 +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>>
>> On 11/4/19 5:05 AM, Walter Wu wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
>>> index 6814d6d6a023..4ff67e2fd2db 100644
>>> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
>>> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
>>> @@ -99,10 +99,14 @@ bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
>>>  }
>>>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write);
>>>  
>>> +extern bool report_enabled(void);
>>> +
>>>  #undef memset
>>>  void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
>>>  {
>>> -	check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_);
>>> +	if (report_enabled() &&
>>> +	    !check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_))
>>> +		return NULL;
>>>  
>>>  	return __memset(addr, c, len);
>>>  }
>>> @@ -110,8 +114,10 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
>>>  #undef memmove
>>>  void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
>>>  {
>>> -	check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
>>> -	check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
>>> +	if (report_enabled() &&
>>> +	   (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) ||
>>> +	    !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)))
>>> +		return NULL;
>>>  
>>>  	return __memmove(dest, src, len);
>>>  }
>>> @@ -119,8 +125,10 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
>>>  #undef memcpy
>>>  void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
>>>  {
>>> -	check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_);
>>> -	check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_);
>>> +	if (report_enabled() &&
>>
>>             report_enabled() checks seems to be useless.
>>
> 
> Hi Andrey,
> 
> If it doesn't have report_enable(), then it will have below the error.
> We think it should be x86 shadow memory is invalid value before KASAN
> initialized, it will have some misjudgments to do directly return when
> it detects invalid shadow value in memset()/memcpy()/memmove(). So we
> add report_enable() to avoid this happening. but we should only use the
> condition "current->kasan_depth == 0" to determine if KASAN is
> initialized. And we try it is pass at x86.
> 

Ok, I see. It just means that check_memory_region() return incorrect result in early stages of boot.
So, the right way to deal with this would be making kasan_report() to return bool ("false" if no report and "true" if reported)
and propagate this return value up to check_memory_region().


>>> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
>>> index 36c645939bc9..52a92c7db697 100644
>>> --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
>>> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c
>>> @@ -107,6 +107,24 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>>>  
>>>  const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
>>>  {
>>> +	/*
>>> +	 * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has three reasons
>>> +	 * to be defined as heap-out-of-bounds bug type.
>>> +	 * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as
>>> +	 *    a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2,
>>> +	 *    so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds.
>>> +	 * 2) If KASAN has new bug type and user-space passes negative size,
>>> +	 *    then there are duplicate reports. So don't produce new bug type
>>> +	 *    in order to prevent duplicate reports by some systems
>>> +	 *    (e.g. syzbot) to report the same bug twice.
>>> +	 * 3) When size is negative numbers, it may be passed from user-space.
>>> +	 *    So we always print heap-out-of-bounds in order to prevent that
>>> +	 *    kernel-space and user-space have the same bug but have duplicate
>>> +	 *    reports.
>>> +	 */
>>  
>> Completely fail to understand 2) and 3). 2) talks something about *NOT* producing new bug
>> type, but at the same time you code actually does that.
>> 3) says something about user-space which have nothing to do with kasan.
>>
> about 2)
> We originally think the heap-out-of-bounds is similar to
> heap-buffer-overflow, maybe we should change the bug type to
> heap-buffer-overflow.

There is no "heap-buffer-overflow".

> 
> about 3)
> Our idea is just to always print "heap-out-of-bounds" and don't
> differentiate if the size come from user-space or not.

Still doesn't make sence to me. KASAN doesn't differentiate if the size coming from user-space
or not. It simply doesn't have any way of knowing from where is the size coming from.