linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] x86/mtrr: only administrator can read the configurations.

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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1911132246220.2507@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
Date:   Wed, 13 Nov 2019 22:47:09 +0100 (CET)
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@...wei.com>, mingo@...hat.com,
        hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org, tyhicks@...onical.com,
        colin.king@...onical.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/mtrr: only administrator can read the
 configurations.

On Tue, 12 Nov 2019, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 06:49:56PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 09:56:16AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > Some recap from being accidentally offlist:
> > > 
> > > - this patch should check capabilities at open time (or retain the
> > >   checks on the opener's permissions for later checks).
> > > 
> > > - changing the DAC permissions might break something that expects to
> > >   read mtrr when not uid 0.
> > > 
> > > - if we leave the DAC permissions alone and just move the capable check
> > >   to the opener, we should get the intent of the original patch. (i.e.
> > >   check against CAP_SYS_ADMIN not just the wider uid 0.)
> > > 
> > > - *this may still break things* if userspace expects to be able to
> > >   read other parts of the file as non-uid-0 and non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> > >   If *that* is the case, then we need to censor the contents using
> > >   the opener's permissions (as done in other /proc cases).
> > > 
> > > I think the most cautious way forward is something like
> > > 51d7b120418e ("/proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to
> > > privileged users"). Untested (and should likely be expanded to know
> > > about read vs write for lockdown interaction):
> > 
> > I'm back'n'forth on this.
> > 
> > So tglx and I agree that it doesn't make a whole lotta sense for
> > non-privileged luserspace to be able to read /proc/mtrr because it is a
> > small leak and normal users shouldn't care about the caching attributes
> > of memory regions in the first place.
> > 
> > So maybe we should do the second variant.
> > 
> > But then we're not supposed to break luserspace.
> > 
> > But then we can revert it if we do...
> > 
> > Ugh.
> 
> Shall I send a patch for just moving the capable() checks into open()
> and if someone yells we switch to the other option on the assumption
> that then we'll have a real-world case we can test the other solution
> against?

Makes sense.

Thanks,

	tglx