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Message-Id: <130E72B7-E7C0-4E96-A580-8F96FAF59996@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2019 22:02:00 -0800
From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@...mens.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
Ralf Ramsauer <ralf.ramsauer@...-regensburg.de>,
"Gupta, Pawan Kumar" <pawan.kumar.gupta@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [FYI PATCH 0/7] Mitigation for CVE-2018-12207
> On Nov 13, 2019, at 9:26 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>
> On 11/13/19 5:17 PM, Nadav Amit wrote:
>> But is it always the case? Looking at __split_large_page(), it seems that the
>> TLB invalidation is only done after the PMD is changed. Can't this leave a
>> small time window in which a malicious actor triggers a machine-check on
>> another core than the one that runs __split_large_page()?
>
> It's not just a split. It has to be a change that results in
> inconsistencies between two entries in the TLB. A normal split doesn't
> change the resulting final translations and is never inconsistent
> between the two translations.
>
> To have an inconsistency, you need to change the backing physical
> address (or cache attributes?). I'd need to go double-check the erratum
> to be sure about the cache attributes.
>
> In any case, that's why we decided that normal kernel mapping
> split/merges don't need to be mitigated. But, we should probably
> document this somewhere if it's not clear.
>
> Pawan, did we document the results of the audit you did anywhere?
Thank you for explaining. I now see that it is clearly written:
"Software modifies the paging structures so that the same linear address
is translated using a large page (2 MB, 4 MB, or 1 GB) with a different
physical address or memory type.” [1]
My bad.
[1] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-machine-check-error-avoidance-page-size-change-0
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