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Message-ID: <a9542dcd-6f02-92eb-bd97-8aa839e9036f@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2019 10:02:25 -0500
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@...ux.intel.com>,
"joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com" <joonas.lahtinen@...ux.intel.com>,
"rodrigo.vivi@...el.com" <rodrigo.vivi@...el.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
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Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
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Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@...mai.com>,
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Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@...ux.intel.com>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"selinux@...r.kernel.org" <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/7] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel
and user space
On 12/16/19 2:58 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote:
>
> Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
> monitoring and observability so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf
> and other subsystems of the kernel.
>
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
> system performance monitoring and observability by decreasing attack surface
> that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
>
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
> system performance monitoring and observability and balance amount of
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided
> in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability is overloaded;
> see Notes to kernel developers, below."
>
> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> include/linux/capability.h | 1 +
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++-
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
> 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index ecce0f43c73a..6342502c4c2a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
> extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
> extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
> +#define perfmon_capable() (capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
I think making it a static inline bool function instead of a macro would
be preferred?
Otherwise,
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
>
> /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
> extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
>
> #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
>
> +/*
> + * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
> + * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
> + */
> +
> +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
>
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON
>
> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
> "audit_control", "setfcap"
>
> #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
> - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
> + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
>
> -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
> #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
> #endif
>
>
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