linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow for overriding MMIO SPTE mask

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Date:   Wed, 18 Dec 2019 12:27:02 -0800
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow for overriding MMIO SPTE mask

On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 01:51:23PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 12/18/19 1:45 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > The KVM MMIO support uses bit 51 as the reserved bit to cause nested page
> > faults when a guest performs MMIO. The AMD memory encryption support uses
> > CPUID functions to define the encryption bit position. Given this, KVM
> > can't assume that bit 51 will be safe all the time.
> > 
> > Add a callback to return a reserved bit(s) mask that can be used for the
> > MMIO pagetable entries. The callback is not responsible for setting the
> > present bit.
> > 
> > If a callback is registered:
> >   - any non-zero mask returned is updated with the present bit and used
> >     as the MMIO SPTE mask.
> >   - a zero mask returned results in a mask with only bit 51 set (i.e. no
> >     present bit) as the MMIO SPTE mask, similar to the way 52-bit physical
> >     addressing is handled.
> > 
> > If no callback is registered, the current method of setting the MMIO SPTE
> > mask is used.
> > 
> > Fixes: 28a1f3ac1d0c ("kvm: x86: Set highest physical address bits in non-present/reserved SPTEs")
> > Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  4 ++-
> >  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
> >  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  2 +-
> >  3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> 
> This patch has some extra churn because kvm_x86_ops isn't set yet when the
> call to kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask() is made. If it's not a problem to move
> setting kvm_x86_ops just a bit earlier in kvm_arch_init(), some of the
> churn can be avoided.

As a completely different alternative, what about handling this purely
within SVM code by overriding the masks during svm_hardware_setup(),
similar to how VMX handles EPT's custom masks, e.g.:

	/*
	 * Override the MMIO masks if memory encryption support is enabled:
	 *   The physical addressing width is reduced. The first bit above the
	 *   new physical addressing limit will always be reserved.
	 */
	if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) >= 0x8000001f) {
		rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
		if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) {
			mask = BIT_ULL(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits) | BIT_ULL(0);
			kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask,
						   ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK);
		}
	}