linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow for overriding MMIO SPTE mask

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Message-ID: <9ffc1936-dbdc-52c8-bbd4-24c773728452@amd.com>
Date:   Wed, 18 Dec 2019 15:18:06 -0600
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow for overriding MMIO SPTE mask

On 12/18/19 2:27 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 01:51:23PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 12/18/19 1:45 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>> The KVM MMIO support uses bit 51 as the reserved bit to cause nested page
>>> faults when a guest performs MMIO. The AMD memory encryption support uses
>>> CPUID functions to define the encryption bit position. Given this, KVM
>>> can't assume that bit 51 will be safe all the time.
>>>
>>> Add a callback to return a reserved bit(s) mask that can be used for the
>>> MMIO pagetable entries. The callback is not responsible for setting the
>>> present bit.
>>>
>>> If a callback is registered:
>>>   - any non-zero mask returned is updated with the present bit and used
>>>     as the MMIO SPTE mask.
>>>   - a zero mask returned results in a mask with only bit 51 set (i.e. no
>>>     present bit) as the MMIO SPTE mask, similar to the way 52-bit physical
>>>     addressing is handled.
>>>
>>> If no callback is registered, the current method of setting the MMIO SPTE
>>> mask is used.
>>>
>>> Fixes: 28a1f3ac1d0c ("kvm: x86: Set highest physical address bits in non-present/reserved SPTEs")
>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
>>> ---
>>>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  4 ++-
>>>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++------------
>>>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  2 +-
>>>  3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>>
>> This patch has some extra churn because kvm_x86_ops isn't set yet when the
>> call to kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask() is made. If it's not a problem to move
>> setting kvm_x86_ops just a bit earlier in kvm_arch_init(), some of the
>> churn can be avoided.
> 
> As a completely different alternative, what about handling this purely
> within SVM code by overriding the masks during svm_hardware_setup(),
> similar to how VMX handles EPT's custom masks, e.g.:
> 
> 	/*
> 	 * Override the MMIO masks if memory encryption support is enabled:
> 	 *   The physical addressing width is reduced. The first bit above the
> 	 *   new physical addressing limit will always be reserved.
> 	 */
> 	if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) >= 0x8000001f) {
> 		rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
> 		if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) {
> 			mask = BIT_ULL(boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits) | BIT_ULL(0);
> 			kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask,
> 						   ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK);
> 		}
> 	}

Works for me if no one has objections to doing it that way (and will
actually make going into stable much easier).

Thanks,
Tom

>