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Message-ID: <e0cb2b8d-e964-bc23-bf80-58d7ac4ed6f1@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 12:24:28 +0300
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
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<james.bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
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Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
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linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
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Subject: [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and
user space
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would
assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events,
i915_perf and other subsystems of the kernel.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing
attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related
to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance
amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations
provided in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability
is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index ecce0f43c73a..883c879baa4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct
extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
+static inline bool perfmon_capable(void)
+{
+ return capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
+/*
+ * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations
+ * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems
+ */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
--
2.20.1
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