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Message-ID: <c93309dc-b920-f5fa-f997-e8b2faf47b88@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2019 12:25:35 +0300
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
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Subject: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged
process
Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged
processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events
subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but
CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged
with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@...ux.intel.com>
---
include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++---
kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 34c7c6910026..f46acd69425f 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EPERM;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 059ee7116008..d9db414f2197 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type)
return -ENOENT;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
/*
@@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type)
return -ENOENT;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
/*
@@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
}
if (attr.namespaces) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
}
--
2.20.1
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