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Message-ID: <20200109182324.GC591973@kroah.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 19:23:24 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...omium.org>,
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>,
Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@...il.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...omium.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@...rochip.com>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@...ronome.com>,
Andrey Ignatov <rdna@...com>, Joe Stringer <joe@...d.net.nz>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 00/13] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI)
On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 05:11:38AM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 8 Jan 2020, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>
> > The cover letter subject line and the Kconfig help text refer to it as a
> > BPF-based "MAC and Audit policy". It has an enforce config option that
> > enables the bpf programs to deny access, providing access control. IIRC, in
> > the earlier discussion threads, the BPF maintainers suggested that Smack and
> > other LSMs could be entirely re-implemented via it in the future, and that
> > such an implementation would be more optimal.
>
> In this case, the eBPF code is similar to a kernel module, rather than a
> loadable policy file. It's a loadable mechanism, rather than a policy, in
> my view.
>
> This would be similar to the difference between iptables rules and
> loadable eBPF networking code. I'd be interested to know how the
> eBPF networking scenarios are handled wrt kernel ABI.
I already know of some people who pre-compile ebpf programs based on a
number of "supported" kernel versions and then load the needed one at
runtime.
Messy, yes, but you are right, ebpf code is much more similiar to a
kernel module than userspace code at the moment.
thanks,
greg k-h
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