Message-ID: <e90e03e3-b92f-6e1a-132f-1b648d9d2139@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date:   Thu, 9 Jan 2020 13:58:58 -0500
From:   Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To:     James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, KP Singh <kpsingh@...omium.org>,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...omium.org>,
        Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@...gle.com>,
        Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
        Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@...il.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
        Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
        Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
        Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>,
        Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...omium.org>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@...rochip.com>,
        Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
        Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@...ronome.com>,
        Andrey Ignatov <rdna@...com>, Joe Stringer <joe@...d.net.nz>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 00/13] MAC and Audit policy using eBPF (KRSI)

On 1/9/20 1:11 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 8 Jan 2020, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> 
>> The cover letter subject line and the Kconfig help text refer to it as a
>> BPF-based "MAC and Audit policy".  It has an enforce config option that
>> enables the bpf programs to deny access, providing access control. IIRC, in
>> the earlier discussion threads, the BPF maintainers suggested that Smack and
>> other LSMs could be entirely re-implemented via it in the future, and that
>> such an implementation would be more optimal.
> 
> In this case, the eBPF code is similar to a kernel module, rather than a
> loadable policy file.  It's a loadable mechanism, rather than a policy, in
> my view.

I thought you frowned on dynamically loadable LSMs for both security and 
correctness reasons? And a traditional security module would necessarily 
fall under GPL; is the eBPF code required to be likewise?  If not, KRSI 
is a gateway for proprietary LSMs...

> This would be similar to the difference between iptables rules and
> loadable eBPF networking code.  I'd be interested to know how the
> eBPF networking scenarios are handled wrt kernel ABI.
> 
> 
>> Again, not arguing for or against, but wondering if people fully understand
>> the implications.  If it ends up being useful, people will build access
>> control systems with it, and it directly exposes a lot of kernel internals to
>> userspace.  There was a lot of concern originally about the LSM hook interface
>> becoming a stable ABI and/or about it being misused.  Exposing that interface
>> along with every kernel data structure exposed through it to userspace seems
>> like a major leap.
> 
> Agreed this is a leap, although I'm not sure I'd characterize it as
> exposure to userspace -- it allows dynamic extension of the LSM API from
> userland, but the code is executed in the kernel.
> 
> KP: One thing I'd like to understand better is the attack surface
> introduced by this.  IIUC, the BTF fields are read only, so the eBPF code
> should not be able to modify any LSM parameters, correct?
> 
> 
>>   Even if the mainline kernel doesn't worry about any kind
>> of stable interface guarantees for it, the distros might be forced to provide
>> some kABI guarantees for it to appease ISVs and users...
> 
> How is this handled currently for other eBPF use-cases?
> 

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