linux-kernel - [PATCH v2 13/28] sys:__sys_setresuid(): handle fsid mappings

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Message-Id: <20200214183554.1133805-14-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Date:   Fri, 14 Feb 2020 19:35:39 +0100
From:   Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
To:     Stéphane Graber <stgraber@...ntu.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc:     smbarber@...omium.org, Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Phil Estes <estesp@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 13/28] sys:__sys_setresuid(): handle fsid mappings

Switch setresuid() to lookup fsids in the fsid mappings. If no fsid mappings
are setup the behavior is unchanged, i.e. fsids are looked up in the id
mappings.

During setresuid() the kfsuid is set to the keuid corresponding the euid that is
requested by userspace. If the requested euid is -1 the kfsuid is reset to the
current keuid. For the latter case this means we need to lookup the
corresponding userspace euid corresponding to the current keuid in the id
mappings and translate this euid into the corresponding kfsuid in the fsid
mappings.

The kfsid to cleanly handle userns visible filesystem is set as before.

We require that a user must have a valid fsid mapping for the target id. This
is consistent with how the setid calls work today without fsid mappings.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>:
  - set kfsid which is used when dealing with proc permission checking
---
 kernel/sys.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 22eea030d9e7..54e072145146 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
 	const struct cred *old;
 	struct cred *new;
 	int retval;
-	kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid;
+	kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid, kfsuid;
 
 	kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
 	keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
@@ -696,11 +696,21 @@ long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
 				goto error;
 		}
 	}
-	if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
+	if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
 		new->euid = keuid;
+		kfsuid = make_kfsuid(ns, euid);
+	} else {
+		kfsuid = kuid_to_kfsuid(new->user_ns, new->euid);
+	}
+	if (!uid_valid(kfsuid)) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
 	if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
 		new->suid = ksuid;
-	new->fsuid = new->euid;
+	new->kfsuid = new->euid;
+	new->fsuid = kfsuid;
 
 	retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
 	if (retval < 0)
-- 
2.25.0