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Message-ID: <20200226132850.GX18400@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 14:28:50 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Subject: Re: [patch 02/10] x86/mce: Disable tracing and kprobes on
do_machine_check()
On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 09:29:00PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> +void notrace do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
> >> {
> >> DECLARE_BITMAP(valid_banks, MAX_NR_BANKS);
> >> DECLARE_BITMAP(toclear, MAX_NR_BANKS);
> >> @@ -1360,6 +1366,7 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *re
> >> ist_exit(regs);
> >> }
> >> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_machine_check);
> >> +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_machine_check);
> >
> > That won't protect all the function called by do_machine_check(), right?
> > There are lots of them.
> >
>
> It at least means we can survive to run actual C code in
> do_machine_check(), which lets us try to mitigate this issue further.
> PeterZ has patches for that, and maybe this series fixes it later on.
> (I'm reading in order!)
Yeah, I don't cover that either. Making the kernel completely kprobe
safe is _lots_ more work I think.
We really need some form of automation for this :/ The current situation
is completely nonsatisfactory.
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