linux-kernel - Re: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v3 03/13] task_isolation: add instruction synchronization memory barrier

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Message-ID: <20200420123628.GB69441@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>
Date:   Mon, 20 Apr 2020 13:36:28 +0100
From:   Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc:     Alex Belits <abelits@...vell.com>,
        "mingo@...nel.org" <mingo@...nel.org>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "linux-api@...r.kernel.org" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        "rostedt@...dmis.org" <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        Prasun Kapoor <pkapoor@...vell.com>,
        "catalin.marinas@....com" <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        "frederic@...nel.org" <frederic@...nel.org>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v3 03/13] task_isolation: add instruction
 synchronization memory barrier

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 01:23:51PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 05:02:01AM +0000, Alex Belits wrote:
> > On Wed, 2020-04-15 at 13:44 +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 09, 2020 at 03:17:40PM +0000, Alex Belits wrote:
> > > > Some architectures implement memory synchronization instructions
> > > > for
> > > > instruction cache. Make a separate kind of barrier that calls them.
> > > 
> > > Modifying the instruction caches requries more than an ISB, and the
> > > 'IMB' naming implies you're trying to order against memory accesses,
> > > which isn't what ISB (generally) does.
> > > 
> > > What exactly do you want to use this for?
> > 
> > I guess, there should be different explanation and naming.
> > 
> > The intention is to have a separate barrier that causes cache
> > synchronization event, for use in architecture-independent code. I am
> > not sure, what exactly it should do to be implemented in architecture-
> > independent manner, so it probably only makes sense along with a
> > regular memory barrier.
> > 
> > The particular place where I had to use is the code that has to run
> > after isolated task returns to the kernel. In the model that I propose
> > for task isolation, remote context synchronization is skipped while
> > task is in isolated in userspace (it doesn't run kernel, and kernel
> > does not modify its userspace code, so it's harmless until entering the
> > kernel).
> 
> > So it will skip the results of kick_all_cpus_sync() that was
> > that was called from flush_icache_range() and other similar places.
> > This means that once it's out of userspace, it should only run
> > some "safe" kernel entry code, and then synchronize in some manner that
> > avoids race conditions with possible IPIs intended for context
> > synchronization that may happen at the same time. My next patch in the
> > series uses it in that one place.
> > 
> > Synchronization will have to be implemented without a mandatory
> > interrupt because it may be triggered locally, on the same CPU. On ARM,
> > ISB is definitely necessary there, however I am not sure, how this
> > should look like on x86 and other architectures. On ARM this probably
> > still should be combined with a real memory barrier and cache
> > synchronization, however I am not entirely sure about details. Would
> > it make more sense to run DMB, IC and ISB? 
> 
> IIUC, we don't need to do anything on arm64 because taking an exception acts
> as a context synchronization event, so I don't think you should try to
> expose this as a new barrier macro. Instead, just make it a pre-requisite
> that architectures need to ensure this behaviour when entering the kernel
> from userspace if they are to select HAVE_ARCH_TASK_ISOLATION.

The CSE from the exception isn't sufficient here, because it needs to
occur after the CPU has re-registered to receive IPIs for
kick_all_cpus_sync(). Otherwise there's a window between taking the
exception and re-registering where a necessary context synchronization
event can be missed. e.g.

CPU A				CPU B
[ Modifies some code ]		
				[ enters exception ]
[ D cache maintenance ]
[ I cache maintenance ]
[ IPI ]				// IPI not taken
  ...				[ register for IPI ] 
[ IPI completes ] 
				[ execute stale code here ]

However, I think 'IMB' is far too generic, and we should have an arch
hook specific to task isolation, as it's far less likely to be abused as
IMB will.

Thanks,
Mark.