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Message-Id: <c1d3a47a7a9a9b8957a132b5265f2d367deefa97.1588234824.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 08:42:21 +0000
From: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
To: pbonzini@...hat.com
Cc: tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com,
joro@...tes.org, bp@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com,
x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
srutherford@...gle.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
venu.busireddy@...cle.com, brijesh.singh@....com
Subject: [PATCH v7 05/18] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command
From: Brijesh Singh <Brijesh.Singh@....com>
The command is used for copying the incoming buffer into the
SEV guest memory space.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@...hat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@...cle.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
---
.../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 24 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 9 +++
3 files changed, 112 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index ef1f1f3a5b40..554aa33a99cc 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -351,6 +351,30 @@ On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative va
For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.12.
+14. KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA
+----------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command can be used by the hypervisor to copy
+the incoming buffers into the guest memory region with encryption context
+created during the KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_receive_update_data {
+ __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */
+ __u32 hdr_len;
+
+ __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the destination guest memory region */
+ __u32 guest_len;
+
+ __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the incoming buffer memory region */
+ __u32 trans_len;
+ };
+
References
==========
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 74a847c9106d..d5dfd0da53b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1251,6 +1251,82 @@ static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+ struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
+ struct sev_data_receive_update_data *data;
+ void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
+ struct page **guest_page;
+ unsigned long n;
+ int ret, offset;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+ sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
+ !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
+ !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
+ offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+ if ((params.guest_len + offset > PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(hdr))
+ return PTR_ERR(hdr);
+
+ trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
+ goto e_free_hdr;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ goto e_free_trans;
+
+ data->hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
+ data->hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
+ data->trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
+ data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
+
+ /* Pin guest memory */
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
+ PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
+ if (!guest_page)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
+ data->guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) +
+ offset;
+ data->guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
+ data->guest_len = params.guest_len;
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, data,
+ &argp->error);
+
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
+
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+e_free_trans:
+ kfree(trans);
+e_free_hdr:
+ kfree(hdr);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -1307,6 +1383,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
break;
+ case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
+ r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 24ac57151d53..0fe1d206d750 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1628,6 +1628,15 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_start {
__u32 session_len;
};
+struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data {
+ __u64 hdr_uaddr;
+ __u32 hdr_len;
+ __u64 guest_uaddr;
+ __u32 guest_len;
+ __u64 trans_uaddr;
+ __u32 trans_len;
+};
+
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
--
2.17.1
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