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Date:   Wed, 6 May 2020 11:36:49 -0700
From:   Matthew Garrett <>
To:     Daniel Kiper <>
Cc:     The development of GNU GRUB <>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <>,,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <>,,
        Andrew Cooper <>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <>,
        "Daniel P. Smith" <>,,
        Javier Martinez Canillas <>,,,,,,
        "Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko" <>,, Peter Jones <>,
        Ross Philipson <>
Subject: Re: [GRUB PATCH RFC 12/18] i386/efi: Report UEFI Secure Boot status
 to the Linux kernel

On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 6:33 AM Daniel Kiper <> wrote:
> On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:29:05AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 4:25 PM Daniel Kiper <> wrote:
> > >
> > > Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various
> > > security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot.
> >
> > I think this needs more context. If the kernel is loaded via the EFI
> > boot stub, the kernel is aware of the UEFI secure boot state. Why
> > duplicate this functionality in order to avoid the EFI stub?
> It seems to me that this issue was discussed here [1] and here [2].
> So, if you want me to improve the commit message I am OK with that.

Yes, I think just providing an explanation for why it's currently
necessary for you to duplicate this is reasonable.

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