linux-kernel - Re: [GRUB PATCH RFC 12/18] i386/efi: Report UEFI Secure Boot status to the Linux kernel

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Message-ID: <20200507104625.dmzqu5ntkdoir7ju@tomti.i.net-space.pl>
Date:   Thu, 7 May 2020 12:46:25 +0200
From:   Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com>
To:     Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Cc:     The development of GNU GRUB <grub-devel@....org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        alexander.burmashev@...cle.com,
        Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com>,
        eric.snowberg@...cle.com,
        Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@...hat.com>,
        kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com,
        krystian.hebel@...eb.com, lukasz.hawrylko@...ux.intel.com,
        michal.zygowski@...eb.com,
        "Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko" <phcoder@...il.com>,
        pirot.krol@...eb.com, Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
        Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [GRUB PATCH RFC 12/18] i386/efi: Report UEFI Secure Boot status
 to the Linux kernel

On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 11:36:49AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 6:33 AM Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:29:05AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 4:25 PM Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@...cle.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various
> > > > security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot.
> > >
> > > I think this needs more context. If the kernel is loaded via the EFI
> > > boot stub, the kernel is aware of the UEFI secure boot state. Why
> > > duplicate this functionality in order to avoid the EFI stub?
> >
> > It seems to me that this issue was discussed here [1] and here [2].
> > So, if you want me to improve the commit message I am OK with that.
>
> Yes, I think just providing an explanation for why it's currently
> necessary for you to duplicate this is reasonable.

Sure, will do!

Daniel