linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] powerpc/ima: fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy

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Date:   Wed, 06 May 2020 22:05:16 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] powerpc/ima: fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy

On Fri, 2020-05-01 at 10:16 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice
> (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc
> secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy rule
> only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This, unfortunately, does
> not take into account the ability of enabling "sig_enforce" on the boot
> command line (module.sig_enforce=1).
> 
> Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the finit_module
> syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded onto the IMA
> keyring.
> 
> This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
> instead.
> 
> Fixes: 4238fad366a6 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules")
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>

Thanks, Nayna.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>