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Message-Id: <158937375594.3526905.9967004768395504429.b4-ty@ellerman.id.au>
Date:   Wed, 13 May 2020 22:43:44 +1000 (AEST)
From:   Michael Ellerman <patch-notifications@...erman.id.au>
To:     Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] powerpc/ima: fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy

On Fri, 1 May 2020 10:16:52 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:
> To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice
> (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc
> secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy rule
> only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This, unfortunately, does
> not take into account the ability of enabling "sig_enforce" on the boot
> command line (module.sig_enforce=1).
> 
> [...]

Applied to powerpc/fixes.

[1/1] powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy
      https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/fa4f3f56ccd28ac031ab275e673ed4098855fed4

cheers

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