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Message-ID: <dc86dffb-c7f8-15bb-db4e-be135da650cc@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 09:40:37 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Adrian Reber <areber@...hat.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>,
Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@...sigma.com>,
Michał Cłapiński <mclapinski@...gle.com>,
Kamil Yurtsever <kyurtsever@...gle.com>,
Dirk Petersen <dipeit@...il.com>,
Christine Flood <chf@...hat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Radostin Stoyanov <rstoyanov1@...il.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Aaron Goidel <acgoide@...ho.nsa.gov>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE
On 5/21/2020 10:53 PM, Adrian Reber wrote:
> This enables CRIU to checkpoint and restore a process as non-root.
I know it sounds pedantic, but could you spell out CRIU once?
While I know that everyone who cares either knows or can guess
what you're talking about, it may be a mystery to some of the
newer kernel developers.
> Over the last years CRIU upstream has been asked a couple of time if it
> is possible to checkpoint and restore a process as non-root. The answer
> usually was: 'almost'.
>
> The main blocker to restore a process was that selecting the PID of the
> restored process, which is necessary for CRIU, is guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
What are the other blockers? Are you going to suggest additional new
capabilities to clear them?
> In the last two years the questions about checkpoint/restore as non-root
> have increased and especially in the last few months we have seen
> multiple people inventing workarounds.
Giving a process CAP_SYS_ADMIN is a non-root solution.
> The use-cases so far and their workarounds:
>
> * Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with
> a resource manager distributing jobs. Users are always running
> as non root, but there was the desire to provide a way to
> checkpoint and restore long running jobs.
> Workaround: setuid wrapper to start CRIU as root as non-root
> https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c
This is a classic and well understood mechanism for dealing with
this kind of situation. You could have checkpointer-filecap-sys_admin.c
instead, if you want to reduce use of the super-user.
> * Another use case to checkpoint/restore processes as non-root
> uses as workaround a non privileged process which cycles through
> PIDs by calling fork() as fast as possible with a rate of
> 100,000 pids/s instead of writing to ns_last_pid
> https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
Oh dear.
> * Fast Java startup using checkpoint/restore.
> We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating
> CRIU into a JVM to decrease the startup time.
> Workaround so far: patch out CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in the kernel
That's not a workaround, it's a policy violation.
Bad JVM! No biscuit!
> * Container migration as non root. There are people already
> using CRIU to migrate containers as non-root. The solution
> there is to run it in a user namespace. So if you are able
> to carefully setup your environment with the namespaces
> it is already possible to restore a container/process as non-root.
This is exactly the kind of situation that user namespaces are
supposed to address.
> Unfortunately it is not always possible to setup an environment
> in such a way and for easier access to non-root based container
> migration this patch is also required.
If a user namespace solution is impossible or (more likely) too
expensive, there's always the checkpointer-filecap-sys_admin option.
> There are probably a few more things guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN required
> to run checkpoint/restore as non-root,
If you need CAP_SYS_ADMIN anyway you're not gaining anything by
separating out CAP_RESTORE.
> but by applying this patch I can
> already checkpoint and restore processes as non-root. As there are
> already multiple workarounds I would prefer to do it correctly in the
> kernel to avoid that CRIU users are starting to invent more workarounds.
You've presented a couple of really inappropriate implementations
that would qualify as workarounds. But the other two are completely
appropriate within the system security policy. They don't "get around"
the problem, they use existing mechanisms as they are intended.
> I have used the following tests to verify that this change works as
> expected by setting the new capability CAP_RESTORE on the two resulting
> test binaries:
>
> $ cat ns_last_pid.c
> // http://efiop-notes.blogspot.com/2014/06/how-to-set-pid-using-nslastpid.html
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <string.h>
> #include <sys/file.h>
> #include <sys/types.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
>
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
> pid_t pid, new_pid;
> char buf[32];
> int fd;
>
> if (argc != 2)
> return 1;
>
> printf("Opening ns_last_pid...\n");
> fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid", O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0644);
> if (fd < 0) {
> perror("Cannot open ns_last_pid");
> return 1;
> }
>
> printf("Locking ns_last_pid...\n");
> if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX)) {
> close(fd);
> printf("Cannot lock ns_last_pid\n");
> return 1;
> }
>
> pid = atoi(argv[1]);
> snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", pid - 1);
> printf("Writing pid-1 to ns_last_pid...\n");
> if (write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf)) {
> printf("Cannot write to buf\n");
> return 1;
> }
>
> printf("Forking...\n");
> new_pid = fork();
> if (new_pid == 0) {
> printf("I am the child!\n");
> exit(0);
> } else if (new_pid == pid)
> printf("I am the parent. My child got the pid %d!\n", new_pid);
> else
> printf("pid (%d) does not match expected pid (%d)\n", new_pid, pid);
>
> printf("Cleaning up...\n");
> if (flock(fd, LOCK_UN))
> printf("Cannot unlock\n");
> close(fd);
> return 0;
> }
> $ id -u; /home/libcap/ns_last_pid 300000
> 1001
> Opening ns_last_pid...
> Locking ns_last_pid...
> Writing pid-1 to ns_last_pid...
> Forking...
> I am the parent. My child got the pid 300000!
> I am the child!
> Cleaning up...
>
> For the clone3() based approach:
> $ cat clone3_set_tid.c
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <stdint.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <string.h>
> #include <sys/types.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
>
> #define ptr_to_u64(ptr) ((__u64)((uintptr_t)(ptr)))
>
> int main(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
> struct clone_args c_args = { };
> pid_t pid, new_pid;
>
> if (argc != 2)
> return 1;
>
> pid = atoi(argv[1]);
> c_args.set_tid = ptr_to_u64(&pid);
> c_args.set_tid_size = 1;
>
> printf("Forking...\n");
> new_pid = syscall(__NR_clone3, &c_args, sizeof(c_args));
> if (new_pid == 0) {
> printf("I am the child!\n");
> exit(0);
> } else if (new_pid == pid)
> printf("I am the parent. My child got the pid %d!\n", new_pid);
> else
> printf("pid (%d) does not match expected pid (%d)\n", new_pid, pid);
> printf("Done\n");
>
> return 0;
> }
> $ id -u; /home/libcap/clone3_set_tid 300000
> 1001
> Forking...
> I am the parent. My child got the pid 300000!
> Done
> I am the child!
>
> Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@...hat.com>
> ---
> include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 9 ++++++++-
> kernel/pid.c | 2 +-
> kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +-
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +++--
> 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index b4345b38a6be..1278313cb2bc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -261,6 +261,11 @@ static inline bool bpf_capable(void)
> return capable(CAP_BPF) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> }
>
> +static inline bool restore_ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns)
> +{
> + return ns_capable(ns, CAP_RESTORE) || ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +}
> +
> /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
> extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index c7372180a0a9..4bcc4e3d41ff 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -406,7 +406,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
> */
> #define CAP_BPF 39
>
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BPF
> +
> +/* Allow checkpoint/restore related operations */
> +/* Allow PID selection during clone3() */
> +/* Allow writing to ns_last_pid */
> +
> +#define CAP_RESTORE 40
> +
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_RESTORE
>
> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> index 3122043fe364..bbc26f2bcff6 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns, pid_t *set_tid,
> if (tid != 1 && !tmp->child_reaper)
> goto out_free;
> retval = -EPERM;
> - if (!ns_capable(tmp->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!restore_ns_capable(tmp->user_ns))
> goto out_free;
> set_tid_size--;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> index 0e5ac162c3a8..f58186b31ce6 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
> @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int pid_ns_ctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> struct ctl_table tmp = *table;
> int ret, next;
>
> - if (write && !ns_capable(pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (write && !restore_ns_capable(pid_ns->user_ns))
> return -EPERM;
>
> /*
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 98e1513b608a..f8b8f12a6ebd 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -27,9 +27,10 @@
> "audit_control", "setfcap"
>
> #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
> - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon", "bpf"
> + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon", "bpf", \
> + "restore"
>
> -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_BPF
> +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_RESTORE
> #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
> #endif
>
>
> base-commit: e8f3274774b45b5f4e9e3d5cad7ff9f43ae3add5
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