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Date:   Fri, 22 May 2020 11:02:28 -0700
From:   Andrei Vagin <>
To:     Christian Brauner <>
Cc:     Adrian Reber <>,
        Eric Biederman <>,
        Pavel Emelyanov <>,
        Oleg Nesterov <>,
        Dmitry Safonov <>,
        Nicolas Viennot <>,
        Michał Cłapiński <>,
        Kamil Yurtsever <>,
        Dirk Petersen <>,
        Christine Flood <>,
        Mike Rapoport <>,
        Radostin Stoyanov <>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <>,
        Serge Hallyn <>,
        Stephen Smalley <>,
        Sargun Dhillon <>,
        Arnd Bergmann <>,
        Aaron Goidel <>,,,,
        Eric Paris <>,
        Jann Horn <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE

On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 09:53:31AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 07:53:50AM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote:
> > 
> > There are probably a few more things guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN required
> > to run checkpoint/restore as non-root, but by applying this patch I can
> > already checkpoint and restore processes as non-root. As there are
> > already multiple workarounds I would prefer to do it correctly in the
> > kernel to avoid that CRIU users are starting to invent more workarounds.
> It sounds ok to me as long as this feature is guarded by any sensible
> capability. I don't want users to be able to randomly choose their pid
> without any capability required.
> We've heard the plea for unprivileged checkpoint/restore through the
> grapevine and a few times about CAP_RESTORE at plumbers but it's one of
> those cases where nobody pushed for it so it's urgency was questionable.
> This is 5.9 material though and could you please add selftests?
> It also seems you have future changes planned that would make certain
> things accessible via CAP_RESTORE that are currently guarded by other
> capabilities. Any specific things in mind? It might be worth knowing
> what we'd be getting ourselves into if you're planning on flipping
> switches in other places.

/proc/pid/map_files is one of the first candidate what we need to think
about. CRIU opens files from /proc/pid/map_files to dump file mappings,
shared memory mappings, memfd files.

Right now, it is impossible to open these files without CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
the root user-namespace (proc_map_files_get_link).

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