[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20200523042749.GA19115@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 21:27:49 -0700
From: Andrei Vagin <avagin@...il.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: Adrian Reber <areber@...hat.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Pavel Emelyanov <ovzxemul@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@...sigma.com>,
Michał Cłapiński <mclapinski@...gle.com>,
Kamil Yurtsever <kyurtsever@...gle.com>,
Dirk Petersen <dipeit@...il.com>,
Christine Flood <chf@...hat.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
Radostin Stoyanov <rstoyanov1@...il.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Aaron Goidel <acgoide@...ho.nsa.gov>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE
On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 09:40:37AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 5/21/2020 10:53 PM, Adrian Reber wrote:
> > There are probably a few more things guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN required
> > to run checkpoint/restore as non-root,
>
> If you need CAP_SYS_ADMIN anyway you're not gaining anything by
> separating out CAP_RESTORE.
>
> > but by applying this patch I can
> > already checkpoint and restore processes as non-root. As there are
> > already multiple workarounds I would prefer to do it correctly in the
> > kernel to avoid that CRIU users are starting to invent more workarounds.
>
> You've presented a couple of really inappropriate implementations
> that would qualify as workarounds. But the other two are completely
> appropriate within the system security policy. They don't "get around"
> the problem, they use existing mechanisms as they are intended.
>
With CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, we will need to use the same mechanisms.
The problem is that CAP_SYS_ADMIN is too wide. If a process has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, it can do a lot of things and the operation of forking a
process with a specified pid isn't the most dangerous one in this case.
Offten security policies don't allow to grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to any
third-party tools even in non-root user namespaces.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists