linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 00/16] KVM protected memory extension

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 26 May 2020 09:17:21 +0300
From:   Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
To:     Liran Alon <liran.alon@...cle.com>
Cc:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
        "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        "Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 00/16] KVM protected memory extension

On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 04:47:18PM +0300, Liran Alon wrote:
> 
> On 22/05/2020 15:51, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> 
> Furthermore, I would like to point out that just unmapping guest data from
> kernel direct-map is not sufficient to prevent all
> guest-to-guest info-leaks via a kernel memory info-leak vulnerability. This
> is because host kernel VA space have other regions
> which contains guest sensitive data. For example, KVM per-vCPU struct (which
> holds vCPU state) is allocated on slab and therefore
> still leakable.

Objects allocated from slab use the direct map, vmalloc() is another story.

> >   - Touching direct mapping leads to fragmentation. We need to be able to
> >     recover from it. I have a buggy patch that aims at recovering 2M/1G page.
> >     It has to be fixed and tested properly
>
> As I've mentioned above, not mapping all guest memory from 1GB hugetlbfs
> will lead to holes in kernel direct-map which force it to not be mapped
> anymore as a series of 1GB huge-pages.
> This have non-trivial performance cost. Thus, I am not sure addressing this
> use-case is valuable.

Out of curiosity, do we actually have some numbers for the "non-trivial
performance cost"? For instance for KVM usecase?


-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.