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Message-ID: <20200609125402.wigqnnhy7lxsyqxf@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2020 08:54:02 -0400
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
Cc: zohar@...ux.ibm.com, paul@...l-moore.com,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-audit@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
On 2020-06-08 14:53, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
> The final log statement in process_buffer_measurement() for failure
> condition is at debug level. This does not log the message unless
> the system log level is raised which would significantly increase
> the messages in the system log. Change this log message to an audit
> message for better triaging failures in the function.
>
> ima_alloc_key_entry() does not log a message for failure condition.
> Add an audit message for failure condition in this function.
>
> Sample audit messages:
>
> [ 8.051937] audit: type=1804 audit(1591633422.365:8): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_keys cause=hashing_error(-22) comm="systemd" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0
>
> [ 8.063218] audit: type=1804 audit(1591633422.377:9): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=alloc_entry(-12) comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0
>
> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++----
> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 2 --
> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 4 +++
> 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index df93ac258e01..8a47249c6238 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
>
> #define NR_BANKS(chip) ((chip != NULL) ? chip->nr_allocated_banks : 0)
>
> +#define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
> +
> /* current content of the policy */
> extern int ima_policy_flag;
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 800fb3bba418..b10f09bc7eca 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -739,6 +739,9 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
> int pcr, const char *keyring)
> {
> int ret = 0;
> + const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
> + const char *op = "measuring_keys";
> + char measurement_audit_cause[AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX];
> struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
> struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
> struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
> @@ -793,21 +796,43 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
> iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
>
> ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
> - if (ret < 0)
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + audit_cause = "hashing_error";
> goto out;
> + }
>
> ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
> - if (ret < 0)
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
> goto out;
> + }
>
> ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
> -
> - if (ret < 0)
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + audit_cause = "store_entry";
> ima_free_template_entry(entry);
> + }
>
> out:
> - if (ret < 0)
> - pr_devel("%s: failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + snprintf(measurement_audit_cause, AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX,
> + "%s(%d)", audit_cause, ret);
> +
> + switch (func) {
> + case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
> + op = "measuring_kexec_cmdline";
> + break;
> + case KEY_CHECK:
> + op = "measuring_keys";
> + break;
> + default:
> + op = "measuring_blacklisted_hash";
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
> + op, measurement_audit_cause, ret, 0);
> + }
>
> return;
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> index fb4ec270f620..4a761d765c6c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> @@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include "ima.h"
>
> -#define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
> -
> /* pre-allocated array of tpm_digest structures to extend a PCR */
> static struct tpm_digest *digests;
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
> index cb3e3f501593..4de31ff172aa 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
> @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
> size_t payload_len)
> {
> int rc = 0;
> + const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
> struct ima_key_entry *entry;
>
> entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -88,6 +89,9 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
>
> out:
> if (rc) {
> + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL,
> + keyring->description, "measuring_keys",
> + audit_cause, rc, 0);
> ima_free_key_entry(entry);
> entry = NULL;
> }
> --
> 2.27.0
>
>
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit@...hat.com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
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