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Message-ID: <1593204023.27152.476.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2020 16:40:23 -0400
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@...hat.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: erichte@...ux.ibm.com, nayna@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on
ARCH_POLICY to runtime
On Tue, 2020-06-23 at 17:26 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
<snip>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> index edde88dbe576..62dc11a5af01 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
>
> config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
> bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
> - depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> + depends on IMA_APPRAISE
Ok
> default y
> help
> This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index e493063a3c34..6742f86b6c60 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -732,12 +732,20 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
> * and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules.
> * (Highest priority)
> */
> - arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy();
> - if (!arch_entries)
> - pr_info("No architecture policies found\n");
> - else
> - add_rules(arch_policy_entry, arch_entries,
> - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);
> + if (arch_ima_secure_or_trusted_boot()) {
Today only "measure" and "appraise" rules are included in the arch
specific policy, but someone might decide they want to include "audit"
rules as well.
I'm not if the "secure_boot" flag is available prior to calling
default_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test
there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg.
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM) &&
!arch_ima_get_secureboot())
> + /* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be
> + * enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing
> + * runtime changes */
Only "appraise" rules are enforced.
Mimi
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