linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 00/16] Core scheduling v6(Internet mail)

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Fri, 14 Aug 2020 09:36:22 +0800
From:   "Li, Aubrey" <aubrey.li@...ux.intel.com>
To:     benbjiang(蒋彪) <benbjiang@...cent.com>
Cc:     Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
        "viremana@...ux.microsoft.com" <viremana@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Nishanth Aravamudan <naravamudan@...italocean.com>,
        Julien Desfossez <jdesfossez@...italocean.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Glexiner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Subhra Mazumdar <subhra.mazumdar@...cle.com>,
        Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Greg Kerr <kerrnel@...gle.com>, Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>,
        Aaron Lu <aaron.lwe@...il.com>,
        Aubrey Li <aubrey.intel@...il.com>,
        Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@....com>,
        Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>,
        Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vineeth Pillai <vineethrp@...il.com>,
        Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>,
        Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
        "Ning, Hongyu" <hongyu.ning@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/16] Core scheduling v6(Internet mail)

On 2020/8/14 8:26, benbjiang(蒋彪) wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Aug 13, 2020, at 12:28 PM, Li, Aubrey <aubrey.li@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 2020/8/13 7:08, Joel Fernandes wrote:
>>> On Wed, Aug 12, 2020 at 10:01:24AM +0800, Li, Aubrey wrote:
>>>> Hi Joel,
>>>>
>>>> On 2020/8/10 0:44, Joel Fernandes wrote:
>>>>> Hi Aubrey,
>>>>>
>>>>> Apologies for replying late as I was still looking into the details.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 11:57:20AM +0800, Li, Aubrey wrote:
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>> +/*
>>>>>> + * Core scheduling policy:
>>>>>> + * - CORE_SCHED_DISABLED: core scheduling is disabled.
>>>>>> + * - CORE_COOKIE_MATCH: tasks with same cookie can run
>>>>>> + *                     on the same core concurrently.
>>>>>> + * - CORE_COOKIE_TRUST: trusted task can run with kernel
>>>>>> 			thread on the same core concurrently. 
>>>>>> + * - CORE_COOKIE_LONELY: tasks with cookie can run only
>>>>>> + *                     with idle thread on the same core.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> +enum coresched_policy {
>>>>>> +       CORE_SCHED_DISABLED,
>>>>>> +       CORE_SCHED_COOKIE_MATCH,
>>>>>> +	CORE_SCHED_COOKIE_TRUST,
>>>>>> +       CORE_SCHED_COOKIE_LONELY,
>>>>>> +};
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can set policy to CORE_COOKIE_TRUST of uperf cgroup and fix this kind
>>>>>> of performance regression. Not sure if this sounds attractive?
>>>>>
>>>>> Instead of this, I think it can be something simpler IMHO:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Consider all cookie-0 task as trusted. (Even right now, if you apply the
>>>>>   core-scheduling patchset, such tasks will share a core and sniff on each
>>>>>   other. So let us not pretend that such tasks are not trusted).
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. All kernel threads and idle task would have a cookie 0 (so that will cover
>>>>>   ksoftirqd reported in your original issue).
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. Add a config option (CONFIG_SCHED_CORE_DEFAULT_TASKS_UNTRUSTED). Default
>>>>>   enable it. Setting this option would tag all tasks that are forked from a
>>>>>   cookie-0 task with their own cookie. Later on, such tasks can be added to
>>>>>   a group. This cover's PeterZ's ask about having 'default untrusted').
>>>>>   (Users like ChromeOS that don't want to userspace system processes to be
>>>>>   tagged can disable this option so such tasks will be cookie-0).
>>>>>
>>>>> 4. Allow prctl/cgroup interfaces to create groups of tasks and override the
>>>>>   above behaviors.
>>>>
>>>> How does uperf in a cgroup work with ksoftirqd? Are you suggesting I set uperf's
>>>> cookie to be cookie-0 via prctl?
>>>
>>> Yes, but let me try to understand better. There are 2 problems here I think:
>>>
>>> 1. ksoftirqd getting idled when HT is turned on, because uperf is sharing a
>>> core with it: This should not be any worse than SMT OFF, because even SMT OFF
>>> would also reduce ksoftirqd's CPU time just core sched is doing. Sure
>>> core-scheduling adds some overhead with IPIs but such a huge drop of perf is
>>> strange. Peter any thoughts on that?
>>>
>>> 2. Interface: To solve the performance problem, you are saying you want uperf
>>> to share a core with ksoftirqd so that it is not forced into idle.  Why not
>>> just keep uperf out of the cgroup?
>>
>> I guess this is unacceptable for who runs their apps in container and vm.
> IMHO,  just as Joel proposed, 
> 1. Consider all cookie-0 task as trusted.
> 2. All kernel threads and idle task would have a cookie 0 
> In that way, all tasks with cookies(including uperf in a cgroup) could run
> concurrently with kernel threads.
> That could be a good solution for the issue. :)

>From uperf point of review, it can trust cookie-0(I assume we still need
some modifications to change cookie-match to cookie-compatible to allow
ZERO and NONZERO run together).

But from kernel thread point of review, it can NOT trust uperf, unless
we set uperf's cookie to 0.

Thanks,
-Aubrey