linux-kernel - Re: TDX #VE in SYSCALL gap (was: [RFD] x86: Curing the exception and syscall trainwreck in hardware)

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Message-ID: <CALCETrUP1T2k3UzZMsXMfAD83xbYEG+nAv3a-LeBjNW+=ijJAg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 25 Aug 2020 09:49:05 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        Pu Wen <puwen@...on.cn>,
        Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@...rosoft.com>,
        Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@...rosoft.com>,
        Dirk Hohndel <dirkhh@...are.com>,
        Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@...mens.com>,
        Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@...oxin.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...ux.intel.com>,
        Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        Gordon Tetlow <gordon@...lows.org>,
        David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@....com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: TDX #VE in SYSCALL gap (was: [RFD] x86: Curing the exception and
 syscall trainwreck in hardware)

On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 9:40 PM Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson@...el.com> wrote:
>
> +Andy
>
> On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 02:52:01PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> > And to help with coordination, here is something prepared (slightly)
> > earlier.
> >
> > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hWejnyDkjRRAW-JEsRjA5c9CKLOPc6VKJQsuvODlQEI/edit?usp=sharing
> >
> > This identifies the problems from software's perspective, along with
> > proposing behaviour which ought to resolve the issues.
> >
> > It is still a work-in-progress.  The #VE section still needs updating in
> > light of the publication of the recent TDX spec.
>
> For #VE on memory accesses in the SYSCALL gap (or NMI entry), is this
> something we (Linux) as the guest kernel actually want to handle gracefully
> (where gracefully means not panicking)?  For TDX, a #VE in the SYSCALL gap
> would require one of two things:
>
>   a) The guest kernel to not accept/validate the GPA->HPA mapping for the
>      relevant pages, e.g. code or scratch data.
>
>   b) The host VMM to remap the GPA (making the GPA->HPA pending again).
>
> (a) is only possible if there's a fatal buggy guest kernel (or perhaps vBIOS).
> (b) requires either a buggy or malicious host VMM.
>
> I ask because, if the answer is "no, panic at will", then we shouldn't need
> to burn an IST for TDX #VE.  Exceptions won't morph to #VE and hitting an
> instruction based #VE in the SYSCALL gap would be a CPU bug or a kernel bug.

Or malicious hypervisor action, and that's a problem.

Suppose the hypervisor remaps a GPA used in the SYSCALL gap (e.g. the
actual SYSCALL text or the first memory it accesses -- I don't have a
TDX spec so I don't know the details).  The user does SYSCALL, the
kernel hits the funny GPA, and #VE is delivered.  The microcode wil
write the IRET frame, with mostly user-controlled contents, wherever
RSP points, and RSP is also user controlled.  Calling this a "panic"
is charitable -- it's really game over against an attacker who is
moderately clever.

The kernel can't do anything about this because it's game over before
the kernel has had the chance to execute any instructions.