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Message-ID: <CAMe9rOo0+SBPtN7yb8_-h0dRAoOXkad8wi9d-EiWAfgFSedXjQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 14:08:06 -0700
From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode
Indirect Branch Tracking
On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 1:59 PM Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz> wrote:
>
> On Fri 2020-09-18 13:24:13, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > If you do another version of this:
> >
> > On 9/18/20 12:23 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > > Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
> > >
> > > Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
> > > oriented programming attacks. It is active when the kernel has this
> > > feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
> > > When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
> > > work, but without IBT protection.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> > > ---
> > > v10:
> > > - Change build-time CET check to config depends on.
> > >
> > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> > > 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > > index 6b6dad011763..b047e0a8d1c2 100644
> > > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> > > @@ -1963,6 +1963,22 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> > >
> > > If unsure, say y.
> > >
> > > +config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
> > > + prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
> > > + def_bool n
> > > + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
> > > + depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection)
> > > + select X86_INTEL_CET
> > > + help
> > > + Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
> > > + CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks. It is active when
> > > + the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
> > > + the application support it. When this feature is enabled,
> > > + legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
> > > + IBT protection.
> > > +
> > > + If unsure, say y
> >
> > If unsure, say y.
>
> Actually, it would be "If unsure, say Y.", to be consistent with the
> rest of the Kconfig.
>
> But I wonder if Yes by default is good idea. Only very new CPUs will
> support this, right? Are they even available at the market? Should the
> help text say "if your CPU is Whatever Lake or newer, ...." :-) ?
>
CET enabled kernel runs on all x86-64 processors. All my machines
are running the same CET enabled kernel binary.
--
H.J.
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