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Message-ID: <019b5e45-b116-7f3d-f1f2-3680afbd676c@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 14:25:12 -0700
From: "Yu, Yu-cheng" <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode
Indirect Branch Tracking
On 9/18/2020 1:59 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Fri 2020-09-18 13:24:13, Randy Dunlap wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> If you do another version of this:
>>
>> On 9/18/20 12:23 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>>> Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
>>>
>>> Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
>>> oriented programming attacks. It is active when the kernel has this
>>> feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
>>> When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
>>> work, but without IBT protection.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
>>> ---
>>> v10:
>>> - Change build-time CET check to config depends on.
>>>
>>> arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>>> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> index 6b6dad011763..b047e0a8d1c2 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> @@ -1963,6 +1963,22 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
>>>
>>> If unsure, say y.
>>>
>>> +config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
>>> + prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
>>> + def_bool n
>>> + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
>>> + depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection)
>>> + select X86_INTEL_CET
>>> + help
>>> + Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
>>> + CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks. It is active when
>>> + the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
>>> + the application support it. When this feature is enabled,
>>> + legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
>>> + IBT protection.
>>> +
>>> + If unsure, say y
>>
>> If unsure, say y.
>
> Actually, it would be "If unsure, say Y.", to be consistent with the
> rest of the Kconfig.
>
> But I wonder if Yes by default is good idea. Only very new CPUs will
> support this, right? Are they even available at the market? Should the
> help text say "if your CPU is Whatever Lake or newer, ...." :-) ?
I will revise the wording if there is another version. But a
CET-capable kernel can run on legacy systems. We have been testing that
combination.
Yu-cheng
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