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Message-ID: <CALCETrWssUxxfhPPJZgPOmpaQcf4o9qCe1j-P7yiPyZVV+O8ZQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:48:25 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled
On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 3:37 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 2020-09-21 at 09:22 -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> > On 9/18/2020 5:11 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 12:23 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
> > > > Emulation of the legacy vsyscall page is required by some programs
> > > > built before 2013. Newer programs after 2013 don't use it.
> > > > Disable vsyscall emulation when Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is
> > > > enabled to enhance security.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> [...]
> > >
> > > Nope, try again. Having IBT on does *not* mean that every library in
> > > the process knows that we have indirect branch tracking. The legacy
> > > bitmap exists for a reason. Also, I want a way to flag programs as
> > > not using the vsyscall page, but that flag should not be called CET.
> > > And a process with vsyscalls off should not be able to read the
> > > vsyscall page, and /proc/self/maps should be correct.
> > >
> > > So you have some choices:
> > >
> > > 1. Drop this patch and make it work.
> > >
> > > 2. Add a real per-process vsyscall control. Either make it depend on
> > > vsyscall=xonly and wire it up correctly or actually make it work
> > > correctly with vsyscall=emulate.
> > >
> > > NAK to any hacks in this space. Do it right or don't do it at all.
> > >
> >
> > We can drop this patch, and bring back the previous patch that fixes up
> > shadow stack and ibt. That makes vsyscall emulation work correctly, and
> > does not force the application to do anything different from what is
> > working now. I will post the previous patch as a reply to this thread
> > so that people can make comments on it.
> >
> > Yu-cheng
>
> Here is the patch:
>
> ------
>
> From dfdee39c795ee5dcee2c77f6ba344a61f4d8124b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 14:15:38 -0800
> Subject: [PATCH 34/43] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch
> Tracking for vsyscall emulation
>
> Vsyscall entry points are effectively branch targets. Mark them with
> ENDBR64 opcodes. When emulating the RET instruction, unwind the shadow
> stack and reset IBT state machine.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_emu_64.S | 9 +++++++
> arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_trace.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> index 44c33103a955..0131c9f7f9c5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
> #include <asm/fixmap.h>
> #include <asm/traps.h>
> #include <asm/paravirt.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
>
> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> #include "vsyscall_trace.h"
> @@ -286,6 +289,32 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
> /* Emulate a ret instruction. */
> regs->ip = caller;
> regs->sp += 8;
> +
> + if (current->thread.cet.shstk_size ||
> + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
> + u64 r;
> +
> + fpregs_lock();
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> + __fpregs_load_activate();
Wouldn't this be nicer if you operated on the memory image, not the registers?
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
> + /* Fixup branch tracking */
> + if (current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r & ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR);
> + }
> +#endif
Seems reasonable on first glance.
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> + /* Unwind shadow stack. */
> + if (current->thread.cet.shstk_size) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, r);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, r + 8);
> + }
> +#endif
What happens if the result is noncanonical? A quick skim of the SDM
didn't find anything. This latter issue goes away if you operate on
the memory image, though -- writing a bogus value is just fine, since
the FP restore will handle it.
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