linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is enabled

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Message-ID: <20200923212925.GC15101@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Wed, 23 Sep 2020 14:29:25 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 8/8] x86: Disallow vsyscall emulation when CET is
 enabled

On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 04:48:25PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 3:37 PM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > index 44c33103a955..0131c9f7f9c5 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
> > @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
> >  #include <asm/fixmap.h>
> >  #include <asm/traps.h>
> >  #include <asm/paravirt.h>
> > +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
> > +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> > +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
> >
> >  #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> >  #include "vsyscall_trace.h"
> > @@ -286,6 +289,32 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
> >         /* Emulate a ret instruction. */
> >         regs->ip = caller;
> >         regs->sp += 8;
> > +
> > +       if (current->thread.cet.shstk_size ||
> > +           current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
> > +               u64 r;
> > +
> > +               fpregs_lock();
> > +               if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> > +                       __fpregs_load_activate();
> 
> Wouldn't this be nicer if you operated on the memory image, not the registers?
> 
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
> > +               /* Fixup branch tracking */
> > +               if (current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled) {
> > +                       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r);
> > +                       wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r & ~CET_WAIT_ENDBR);
> > +               }
> > +#endif
> 
> Seems reasonable on first glance.
> 
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
> > +               /* Unwind shadow stack. */
> > +               if (current->thread.cet.shstk_size) {
> > +                       rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, r);
> > +                       wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, r + 8);
> > +               }
> > +#endif
> 
> What happens if the result is noncanonical?  A quick skim of the SDM
> didn't find anything.  This latter issue goes away if you operate on
> the memory image, though -- writing a bogus value is just fine, since
> the FP restore will handle it.

#GP, the SSP MSRs do canonical checks.