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Message-ID: <20200924220722.GE119995@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 01:07:22 +0300
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@...cle.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
asapek@...gle.com, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>, chenalexchen@...gle.com,
Conrad Parker <conradparker@...gle.com>, cyhanish@...gle.com,
"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@...el.com>,
Josh Triplett <josh@...htriplett.org>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>,
"Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, Keith Moyer <kmoy@...gle.com>,
Christian Ludloff <ludloff@...gle.com>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@...hat.com>,
Patrick Uiterwijk <puiterwijk@...hat.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, yaozhangx@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect()
On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 01:10:31PM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 9/24/20 1:01 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> >> In pseudo-C, it's something logically like this for the "nice" case:
> >>
> >> ptr = mmap("/some/executable", PROT_EXEC);
> >> ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, ptr, size);
> >> mmap(sgx_fd);
> >> EENTER;
> >>
> >> And we're trying to thwart:
> >>
> >> ptr = mmap("/mnt/noexec/file", PROT_READ);
> >> ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, ptr, size);
> >> mmap(sgx_fd);
> >> EENTER;
> >>
> >> because that loads data into the enclave which is executable but which
> >> was not executable normally. But, we're allowing this from anonymous
> >> memory, so this would seem to work:
> >>
> >> ptr = mmap("/mnt/noexec/file", PROT_READ);
> >> buffer = malloc(PAGE_SIZE);
> >> memcpy(buffer, ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
> >> // need mprotect(buf, PROT_EXEC)???
> >> ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, buffer, size);
> >> mmap(sgx_fd);
> >> EENTER;
> >>
> >> and give the same result. What am I missing?
> > The last example, where the enclave is copied to a buffer, is out of scope
> > for noexec. But, it is in scope for LSMs, e.g. for this last example, we
> > could add an LSM upcall so that SELinux could require PROCESS_EXECMEM (or an
> > SGX specific equivalent).
>
> Why don't we just declare enclave memory as "out of scope for noexec" in
> the same way that anonymous memory is, and just discard this patch?
> That doesn't seem too much of a stretch.
I did that already for v39. It unconditionally discards noexec
partitions.
I see EMODPE as the key driver for this patch, not noexec partitions.
I.e. post you've done SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT you are capped when it
comes to permissions.
/Jarkko
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