linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation

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Message-ID: <CALCETrWuhPE3A7eWC=ERJa7i7jLtsXnfu04PKUFJ-Gybro+p=Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 28 Sep 2020 10:37:42 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 8/8] x86/vsyscall/64: Fixup Shadow Stack and Indirect
 Branch Tracking for vsyscall emulation

On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 9:59 AM Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 2020-09-25 at 09:51 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Sep 25, 2020, at 9:48 AM, Yu, Yu-cheng <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com> wrote:
> +
> +               cet = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
> +               if (!cet) {
> +                       /*
> +                        * This is an unlikely case where the task is
> +                        * CET-enabled, but CET xstate is in INIT.
> +                        */
> +                       WARN_ONCE(1, "CET is enabled, but no xstates");

"unlikely" doesn't really cover this.

> +                       fpregs_unlock();
> +                       goto sigsegv;
> +               }
> +
> +               if (cet->user_ssp && ((cet->user_ssp + 8) < TASK_SIZE_MAX))
> +                       cet->user_ssp += 8;

This looks buggy.  The condition should be "if SHSTK is on, then add 8
to user_ssp".  If the result is noncanonical, then some appropriate
exception should be generated, probably by the FPU restore code -- see
below.  You should be checking the SHSTK_EN bit, not SSP.

Also, can you point me to where any of these canonicality rules are
documented in the SDM?  I looked and I can't find them.


This reminds me: this code in extable.c needs to change.

__visible bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                                    struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
                                    unsigned long error_code,
                                    unsigned long fault_addr)
{
        regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);

        WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad FPU state detected at %pB, reinitializing
FPU registers.",
                  (void *)instruction_pointer(regs));

        __copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&init_fpstate, -1);

Now that we have supervisor states like CET, this is buggy.  This
should do something intelligent like initializing all the *user* state
and trying again.  If that succeeds, a signal should be sent rather
than just corrupting the task.  And if it fails, then perhaps some
actual intelligence is needed.  We certainly should not just disable
CET because something is wrong with the CET MSRs.