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Message-ID: <CAFA6WYOqknmYcoxPQKOk2rW+gJZ_8fQXZBMcicT9f562C0o-GA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 10:36:21 +0530
From: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@...il.com>,
Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@...aro.org>,
Markus Wamser <Markus.Wamser@...ed-mode.de>,
Luke Hinds <lhinds@...hat.com>,
"open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Doc Mailing List <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
On Tue, 13 Oct 2020 at 19:10, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 04:58:47PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > On Tue, 13 Oct 2020 at 07:52, Jarkko Sakkinen
> > <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 03:37:48PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > > > Add MAINTAINERS entry for TEE based Trusted Keys framework.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> > > > Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++++++
> > > > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> > > > index 48aff80..eb3d889 100644
> > > > --- a/MAINTAINERS
> > > > +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> > > > @@ -9663,6 +9663,14 @@ F: include/keys/trusted-type.h
> > > > F: include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
> > > > F: security/keys/trusted-keys/
> > > >
> > > > +KEYS-TRUSTED-TEE
> > > > +M: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>
> > > > +L: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> > > > +L: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> > > > +S: Supported
> > > > +F: include/keys/trusted_tee.h
> > > > +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
> > > > +
> > > > KEYS/KEYRINGS
> > > > M: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> > > > M: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
> > > > --
> > > > 2.7.4
> > >
> > > I'm sorry but I think I have changed my mind on this. This has been
> > > spinning for a while and sometimes conclusions change over the time.
> > >
> > > I don't think that we really need a separate subsystem tag.
> >
> > I don't see it as a separate subsystem but rather a kind of underlying
> > trust source (TEE) driver plugged into existing trusted keys
> > subsystem. We could relate it to the RNG subsystem as well where there
> > is a subsystem maintainer and specific driver maintainers.
> >
> > IMO, having a dedicated entry like this brings clarity in maintenance
> > and in future we may have more trust sources like this added where
> > everyone may not have access to all the trust sources to test.
>
> More entries pointing to the exact same stuff does not necessarily mean
> clarity in my books.
>
> > > I'd be for a
> > > new M-entry or R-entry to the existing subsystem tag. It's essential to
> > > have ack from someone with ARM and TEE knowledge but this way too heavy
> > > for the purpose.
> >
> > If you still think otherwise then I am fine with a new M-entry for
> > existing trusted keys subsystem as well.
>
> Adding a M-entry does makes sense because trusted keys backends can be
> based on various technologies and standard. It's a different in that
> sense than lets say a TPM hardware driver.
>
> > > I also see it the most manageable if the trusted keys PR's come from a
> > > single source.
> >
> > I echo here with you to have a single source for trusted keys PR's
> > irrespective of whether we go with a separate trust source entry or
> > update existing subsystem entry.
> >
> > -Sumit
>
> And I echo that oviously if there is someone to say the final ack about
> TEE, I will require that as the minimum to ever pick any of those
> changes :-)
>
> I would resolve this with just the M-entry, and we can *later on*
> restructure, if there is a need for that. These things are not sealed
> to stone.
Okay, will add a M-entry for existing trusted keys subsystem.
-Sumit
>
> /Jarkko
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