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Message-ID: <de287149-ff42-40ca-5bd1-f48969880a06@digikod.net>
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 12:30:12 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@...bridgegreys.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Vincent Dagonneau <vincent.dagonneau@....gouv.fr>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v22 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations
On 29/10/2020 02:06, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 9:04 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>> These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes
>> to sandbox themselves:
>> * landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file
>> descriptor.
>> * landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a
>> ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor.
>> * landlock_enforce_ruleset_current(2): Enforces a ruleset on the current
>> thread and its future children (similar to seccomp). This syscall has
>> the same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the
>> no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user
>> namespace.
> [...]
>> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
>> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
>> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>
> [...]
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> [...]
>> +/**
>> + * struct landlock_path_beneath_attr - Path hierarchy definition
>> + *
>> + * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule().
>> + */
>> +struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
>> + /**
>> + * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed actions for this file hierarchy
>> + * (cf. `Filesystem flags`_).
>> + */
>> + __u64 allowed_access;
>> + /**
>> + * @parent_fd: File descriptor, open with ``O_PATH``, which identify
>
> nit: "identifies"
OK
>
>> + * the parent directory of a file hierarchy, or just a file.
>> + */
>> + __s32 parent_fd;
>> + /*
>> + * This struct is packed to avoid trailing reserved members.
>> + * Cf. security/landlock/syscall.c:build_check_abi()
>> + */
>> +} __attribute__((packed));
> [...]
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscall.c b/security/landlock/syscall.c
> [...]
>> +static int copy_min_struct_from_user(void *const dst, const size_t ksize,
>> + const size_t ksize_min, const void __user *const src,
>> + const size_t usize)
>> +{
>> + /* Checks buffer inconsistencies. */
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(!dst);
>> + if (!src)
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + /* Checks size ranges. */
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize <= 0);
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize < ksize_min);
>
> To make these checks work reliably, you should add __always_inline to
> the function.
Done.
>
>> + if (usize < ksize_min)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + if (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
>> + return -E2BIG;
>> +
>> + /* Copies user buffer and fills with zeros. */
>> + return copy_struct_from_user(dst, ksize, src, usize);
>> +}
> [...]
>> +static int get_path_from_fd(const s32 fd, struct path *const path)
>> +{
>> + struct fd f;
>> + int err = 0;
>> +
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(fd,
>> + ((struct landlock_path_beneath_attr *)NULL)->parent_fd));
>> +
>> + /* Handles O_PATH. */
>> + f = fdget_raw(fd);
>> + if (!f.file)
>> + return -EBADF;
>> + /*
>> + * Only allows O_PATH file descriptor: enables to restrict ambient
>> + * filesystem access without requiring to open and risk leaking or
>> + * misusing a file descriptor. Forbid internal filesystems (e.g.
>> + * nsfs), including pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable
>> + * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs).
>> + */
>> + if (!(f.file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH) ||
>> + (f.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) ||
>> + (f.file->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
>> + d_is_negative(f.file->f_path.dentry) ||
>> + IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(f.file->f_path.dentry))) {
>> + err = -EBADFD;
>> + goto out_fdput;
>> + }
>> + path->mnt = f.file->f_path.mnt;
>> + path->dentry = f.file->f_path.dentry;
>
> those two lines can be replaced with "*path = f.file->f_path"
Done.
>
>> + path_get(path);
>> +
>> +out_fdput:
>> + fdput(f);
>> + return err;
>> +}
> [...]
>> +/**
>> + * sys_landlock_enforce_ruleset_current - Enforce a ruleset on the current task
>> + *
>> + * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset to merge with the target.
>> + * @flags: Must be 0.
>> + *
>> + * This system call enables to enforce a Landlock ruleset on the current
>> + * thread. Enforcing a ruleset requires that the task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its
>> + * namespace or be running with no_new_privs. This avoids scenarios where
>
> s/be/is/
OK.
>
>> + * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
>> + *
>> + * Possible returned errors are:
>> + *
>> + * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
>> + * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0.
>> + * - EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread;
>> + * - EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor;
>> + * - EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no read access to the underlying ruleset, or the
>> + * current thread is not running with no_new_privs (or doesn't have
>> + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace).
>> + */
>> +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_enforce_ruleset_current,
>> + const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32, flags)
>> +{
>> + struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom, *ruleset;
>> + struct cred *new_cred;
>> + struct landlock_cred_security *new_llcred;
>> + int err;
>> +
>> + if (!landlock_initialized)
>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +
>> + /* No flag for now. */
>> + if (flags)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Similar checks as for seccomp(2), except that an -EPERM may be
>> + * returned.
>> + */
>> + if (!task_no_new_privs(current)) {
>> + err = security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
>> + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
>
> I think this should be ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)?
Right. The main difference is that ns_capable*() set PF_SUPERPRIV in
current->flags. I guess seccomp should use ns_capable_noaudit() as well?
>
>> + if (err)
>> + return err;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Gets and checks the ruleset. */
>> + ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ);
>> + if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
>> + return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
>> +
>> + /* Prepares new credentials. */
>> + new_cred = prepare_creds();
>> + if (!new_cred) {
>> + err = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out_put_ruleset;
>> + }
>> + new_llcred = landlock_cred(new_cred);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * There is no possible race condition while copying and manipulating
>> + * the current credentials because they are dedicated per thread.
>> + */
>> + new_dom = landlock_merge_ruleset(new_llcred->domain, ruleset);
>> + if (IS_ERR(new_dom)) {
>> + err = PTR_ERR(new_dom);
>> + goto out_put_creds;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Replaces the old (prepared) domain. */
>> + landlock_put_ruleset(new_llcred->domain);
>> + new_llcred->domain = new_dom;
>> +
>> + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
>> + return commit_creds(new_cred);
>> +
>> +out_put_creds:
>> + abort_creds(new_cred);
>> + return err;
>
> I think this "return err" is wrong - don't we still have to put "ruleset" here?
Oh yes, good catch!
>
>
>> +out_put_ruleset:
>> + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
>> + return err;
>> +}
>> --
>> 2.28.0
>>
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