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Message-ID: <20201030160004.GE50718@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 16:00:04 +0000
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 3/9] arm64, kfence: enable KFENCE for ARM64
On Fri, Oct 30, 2020 at 03:49:26AM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 29, 2020 at 2:17 PM Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com> wrote:
> > @@ -312,6 +313,9 @@ static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
> > "Ignoring spurious kernel translation fault at virtual address %016lx\n", addr))
> > return;
> >
> > + if (kfence_handle_page_fault(addr))
> > + return;
>
> As in the X86 case, we may want to ensure that this doesn't run for
> permission faults, only for non-present pages. Maybe move this down
> into the third branch of the "if" block below (neither permission
> fault nor NULL deref)?
I think that'd make sense. Those cases *should* be mutually exclusive,
but it'd be more robust to do the KFENCE checks in that last block so
that if something goes wrong wrong within KFENCE we can't get stuck in a
loop failing to service an instruction abort or similar.
Either that, or factor out an is_el1_translation_fault() and only do the
KFENCE check and is_spurious_el1_translation_fault() check under that.
Thanks,
Mark.
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