linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 4/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

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Date:   Fri, 13 Nov 2020 13:58:48 +0000
From:   Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>
To:     Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>
Cc:     Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Christopher Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
        Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
        Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nvdimm@...ts.01.org, linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
        x86@...nel.org, Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@...u.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create
 "secret" memory areas

On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 05:14:39PM +0200, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> +static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
> +{
> +	struct address_space *mapping = vmf->vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
> +	struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
> +	pgoff_t offset = vmf->pgoff;
> +	unsigned long addr;
> +	struct page *page;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
> +		return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
> +
> +	page = find_get_entry(mapping, offset);

Why did you decide to use find_get_entry() here?  You don't handle
swap or shadow entries.

> +	if (!page) {
> +		page = secretmem_alloc_page(vmf->gfp_mask);
> +		if (!page)
> +			return vmf_error(-EINVAL);

Why is this EINVAL and not ENOMEM?

> +		ret = add_to_page_cache(page, mapping, offset, vmf->gfp_mask);
> +		if (unlikely(ret))
> +			goto err_put_page;
> +
> +		ret = set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(page, 1);
> +		if (ret)
> +			goto err_del_page_cache;
> +
> +		addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
> +		flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> +		__SetPageUptodate(page);
> +
> +		ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
> +	}
> +
> +	vmf->page = page;
> +	return ret;

Does sparse not warn you about this abuse of vm_fault_t?  Separate out
'ret' and 'err'.


Andrew, please fold in this fix.  I suspect Mike will want to fix
the other things I mention above.

diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index 3dfdbd85ba00..09ca27f21661 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
 	if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
 		return vmf_error(-EINVAL);
 
-	page = find_get_entry(mapping, offset);
+	page = find_get_page(mapping, offset);
 	if (!page) {
 		page = secretmem_alloc_page(ctx, vmf->gfp_mask);
 		if (!page)