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Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 10:43:38 -0500
From: Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>
To: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
Cc: Nishanth Aravamudan <naravamudan@...italocean.com>,
Julien Desfossez <jdesfossez@...italocean.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Vineeth Pillai <viremana@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Aaron Lu <aaron.lwe@...il.com>,
Aubrey Li <aubrey.intel@...il.com>, tglx@...utronix.de,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mingo@...nel.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, fweisbec@...il.com,
keescook@...omium.org, kerrnel@...gle.com,
Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>,
Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@....com>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, vineeth@...byteword.org,
Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@...el.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Agata Gruza <agata.gruza@...el.com>,
Antonio Gomez Iglesias <antonio.gomez.iglesias@...el.com>,
graf@...zon.com, konrad.wilk@...cle.com, dfaggioli@...e.com,
pjt@...gle.com, rostedt@...dmis.org, derkling@...gle.com,
benbjiang@...cent.com, James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com,
OWeisse@...ch.edu, Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@...cle.com>,
Junaid Shahid <junaids@...gle.com>, jsbarnes@...gle.com,
chris.hyser@...cle.com, Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@...ux.intel.com>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...el.com>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 -tip 13/26] kernel/entry: Add support for core-wide
protection of kernel-mode
On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 09:50:37AM -0500, Joel Fernandes wrote:
> > > Can I add your Reviewed-by tag to below updated patch? Thanks for review!
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>
>
> Will add, thanks!
>
> - Joel
Alexandre, there was one more trivial fixup I had to make. Just fyi:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jfern/linux.git/commit/?h=coresched&id=06a302df95f3a235e2680102ec4e5da10c9b87a0
Basically, I need to conditionally call sched_core_unsafe_exit() depending on
value of sched_core_protect_kernel= option and CONFIG_SCHED_CORE. Below is
updated patch:
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index bd1a5b87a5e2..a36f08d74e09 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4678,6 +4678,15 @@
sbni= [NET] Granch SBNI12 leased line adapter
+ sched_core_protect_kernel=
+ [SCHED_CORE] Pause SMT siblings of a core running in
+ user mode, if at least one of the siblings of the core
+ is running in kernel mode. This is to guarantee that
+ kernel data is not leaked to tasks which are not trusted
+ by the kernel. A value of 0 disables protection, 1
+ enables protection. The default is 1. Note that protection
+ depends on the arch defining the _TIF_UNSAFE_RET flag.
+
sched_debug [KNL] Enables verbose scheduler debug messages.
schedstats= [KNL,X86] Enable or disable scheduled statistics.
diff --git a/include/linux/entry-common.h b/include/linux/entry-common.h
index 1a128baf3628..022e1f114157 100644
--- a/include/linux/entry-common.h
+++ b/include/linux/entry-common.h
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@
# define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (0)
#endif
+#ifndef _TIF_UNSAFE_RET
+# define _TIF_UNSAFE_RET (0)
+#endif
+
#ifndef _TIF_UPROBE
# define _TIF_UPROBE (0)
#endif
@@ -74,7 +78,7 @@
#define EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK \
(_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | \
_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_PATCH_PENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL | \
- ARCH_EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK)
+ _TIF_UNSAFE_RET | ARCH_EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK)
/**
* arch_check_user_regs - Architecture specific sanity check for user mode regs
@@ -444,4 +448,10 @@ irqentry_state_t noinstr irqentry_nmi_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
*/
void noinstr irqentry_nmi_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t irq_state);
+/* entry_kernel_protected - Is kernel protection on entry/exit into kernel supported? */
+static inline bool entry_kernel_protected(void)
+{
+ return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SCHED_CORE) && sched_core_kernel_protected()
+ && _TIF_UNSAFE_RET != 0;
+}
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index d38e904dd603..fe6f225bfbf9 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -2071,4 +2071,16 @@ int sched_trace_rq_nr_running(struct rq *rq);
const struct cpumask *sched_trace_rd_span(struct root_domain *rd);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
+void sched_core_unsafe_enter(void);
+void sched_core_unsafe_exit(void);
+bool sched_core_wait_till_safe(unsigned long ti_check);
+bool sched_core_kernel_protected(void);
+#else
+#define sched_core_unsafe_enter(ignore) do { } while (0)
+#define sched_core_unsafe_exit(ignore) do { } while (0)
+#define sched_core_wait_till_safe(ignore) do { } while (0)
+#define sched_core_kernel_protected(ignore) do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/kernel/entry/common.c b/kernel/entry/common.c
index bc75c114c1b3..9d9d926f2a1c 100644
--- a/kernel/entry/common.c
+++ b/kernel/entry/common.c
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ static __always_inline void enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
instrumentation_begin();
trace_hardirqs_off_finish();
+
+ if (entry_kernel_protected())
+ sched_core_unsafe_enter();
instrumentation_end();
}
@@ -145,6 +148,26 @@ static void handle_signal_work(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long ti_work)
arch_do_signal_or_restart(regs, ti_work & _TIF_SIGPENDING);
}
+static unsigned long exit_to_user_get_work(void)
+{
+ unsigned long ti_work = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
+
+ if (!entry_kernel_protected())
+ return ti_work;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
+ ti_work &= EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK;
+ if ((ti_work & _TIF_UNSAFE_RET) == ti_work) {
+ sched_core_unsafe_exit();
+ if (sched_core_wait_till_safe(EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK)) {
+ sched_core_unsafe_enter(); /* not exiting to user yet. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ return READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
+#endif
+}
+
static unsigned long exit_to_user_mode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long ti_work)
{
@@ -182,7 +205,7 @@ static unsigned long exit_to_user_mode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs,
* enabled above.
*/
local_irq_disable_exit_to_user();
- ti_work = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
+ ti_work = exit_to_user_get_work();
}
/* Return the latest work state for arch_exit_to_user_mode() */
@@ -191,9 +214,10 @@ static unsigned long exit_to_user_mode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs,
static void exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
- unsigned long ti_work = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
+ unsigned long ti_work;
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+ ti_work = exit_to_user_get_work();
if (unlikely(ti_work & EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK))
ti_work = exit_to_user_mode_loop(regs, ti_work);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index a5e04078ba5d..56d6a382e3ff 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -76,6 +76,27 @@ __read_mostly int scheduler_running;
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(sched_core_protect_kernel);
+static int __init set_sched_core_protect_kernel(char *str)
+{
+ unsigned long val = 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &val) && !val)
+ static_branch_disable(&sched_core_protect_kernel);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("sched_core_protect_kernel=", set_sched_core_protect_kernel);
+
+/* Is the kernel protected by core scheduling? */
+bool sched_core_kernel_protected(void)
+{
+ return static_branch_likely(&sched_core_protect_kernel);
+}
+
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__sched_core_enabled);
/* kernel prio, less is more */
@@ -4596,6 +4617,226 @@ static inline bool cookie_match(struct task_struct *a, struct task_struct *b)
return a->core_cookie == b->core_cookie;
}
+/*
+ * Handler to attempt to enter kernel. It does nothing because the exit to
+ * usermode or guest mode will do the actual work (of waiting if needed).
+ */
+static void sched_core_irq_work(struct irq_work *work)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void init_sched_core_irq_work(struct rq *rq)
+{
+ init_irq_work(&rq->core_irq_work, sched_core_irq_work);
+}
+
+/*
+ * sched_core_wait_till_safe - Pause the caller's hyperthread until the core
+ * exits the core-wide unsafe state. Obviously the CPU calling this function
+ * should not be responsible for the core being in the core-wide unsafe state
+ * otherwise it will deadlock.
+ *
+ * @ti_check: We spin here with IRQ enabled and preempt disabled. Break out of
+ * the loop if TIF flags are set and notify caller about it.
+ *
+ * IRQs should be disabled.
+ */
+bool sched_core_wait_till_safe(unsigned long ti_check)
+{
+ bool restart = false;
+ struct rq *rq;
+ int cpu;
+
+ /* We clear the thread flag only at the end, so no need to check for it. */
+ ti_check &= ~_TIF_UNSAFE_RET;
+
+ cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
+
+ if (!sched_core_enabled(rq))
+ goto ret;
+
+ /* Down grade to allow interrupts to prevent stop_machine lockups.. */
+ preempt_disable();
+ local_irq_enable();
+
+ /*
+ * Wait till the core of this HT is not in an unsafe state.
+ *
+ * Pair with raw_spin_lock/unlock() in sched_core_unsafe_enter/exit().
+ */
+ while (smp_load_acquire(&rq->core->core_unsafe_nest) > 0) {
+ cpu_relax();
+ if (READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags) & ti_check) {
+ restart = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Upgrade it back to the expectations of entry code. */
+ local_irq_disable();
+ preempt_enable();
+
+ret:
+ if (!restart)
+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_UNSAFE_RET);
+
+ return restart;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enter the core-wide IRQ state. Sibling will be paused if it is running
+ * 'untrusted' code, until sched_core_unsafe_exit() is called. Every attempt to
+ * avoid sending useless IPIs is made. Must be called only from hard IRQ
+ * context.
+ */
+void sched_core_unsafe_enter(void)
+{
+ const struct cpumask *smt_mask;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct rq *rq;
+ int i, cpu;
+
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_core_protect_kernel))
+ return;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
+ if (!sched_core_enabled(rq))
+ goto ret;
+
+ /* Ensure that on return to user/guest, we check whether to wait. */
+ if (current->core_cookie)
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_UNSAFE_RET);
+
+ /* Count unsafe_enter() calls received without unsafe_exit() on this CPU. */
+ rq->core_this_unsafe_nest++;
+
+ /*
+ * Should not nest: enter() should only pair with exit(). Both are done
+ * during the first entry into kernel and the last exit from kernel.
+ * Nested kernel entries (such as nested interrupts) will only trigger
+ * enter() and exit() on the outer most kernel entry and exit.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->core_this_unsafe_nest != 1))
+ goto ret;
+
+ raw_spin_lock(rq_lockp(rq));
+ smt_mask = cpu_smt_mask(cpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Contribute this CPU's unsafe_enter() to the core-wide unsafe_enter()
+ * count. The raw_spin_unlock() release semantics pairs with the nest
+ * counter's smp_load_acquire() in sched_core_wait_till_safe().
+ */
+ WRITE_ONCE(rq->core->core_unsafe_nest, rq->core->core_unsafe_nest + 1);
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->core->core_unsafe_nest == UINT_MAX))
+ goto unlock;
+
+ if (irq_work_is_busy(&rq->core_irq_work)) {
+ /*
+ * Do nothing more since we are in an IPI sent from another
+ * sibling to enforce safety. That sibling would have sent IPIs
+ * to all of the HTs.
+ */
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not the first ones on the core to enter core-wide unsafe
+ * state, do nothing.
+ */
+ if (rq->core->core_unsafe_nest > 1)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ /* Do nothing more if the core is not tagged. */
+ if (!rq->core->core_cookie)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ for_each_cpu(i, smt_mask) {
+ struct rq *srq = cpu_rq(i);
+
+ if (i == cpu || cpu_is_offline(i))
+ continue;
+
+ if (!srq->curr->mm || is_task_rq_idle(srq->curr))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Skip if HT is not running a tagged task. */
+ if (!srq->curr->core_cookie && !srq->core_pick)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Force sibling into the kernel by IPI. If work was already
+ * pending, no new IPIs are sent. This is Ok since the receiver
+ * would already be in the kernel, or on its way to it.
+ */
+ irq_work_queue_on(&srq->core_irq_work, i);
+ }
+unlock:
+ raw_spin_unlock(rq_lockp(rq));
+ret:
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process any work need for either exiting the core-wide unsafe state, or for
+ * waiting on this hyperthread if the core is still in this state.
+ *
+ * @idle: Are we called from the idle loop?
+ */
+void sched_core_unsafe_exit(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned int nest;
+ struct rq *rq;
+ int cpu;
+
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_core_protect_kernel))
+ return;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
+
+ /* Do nothing if core-sched disabled. */
+ if (!sched_core_enabled(rq))
+ goto ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Can happen when a process is forked and the first return to user
+ * mode is a syscall exit. Either way, there's nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (rq->core_this_unsafe_nest == 0)
+ goto ret;
+
+ rq->core_this_unsafe_nest--;
+
+ /* enter() should be paired with exit() only. */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->core_this_unsafe_nest != 0))
+ goto ret;
+
+ raw_spin_lock(rq_lockp(rq));
+ /*
+ * Core-wide nesting counter can never be 0 because we are
+ * still in it on this CPU.
+ */
+ nest = rq->core->core_unsafe_nest;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!nest);
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(rq->core->core_unsafe_nest, nest - 1);
+ /*
+ * The raw_spin_unlock release semantics pairs with the nest counter's
+ * smp_load_acquire() in sched_core_wait_till_safe().
+ */
+ raw_spin_unlock(rq_lockp(rq));
+ret:
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
// XXX fairness/fwd progress conditions
/*
* Returns
@@ -4991,6 +5232,7 @@ static inline void sched_core_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu)
rq = cpu_rq(i);
if (rq->core && rq->core == rq)
core_rq = rq;
+ init_sched_core_irq_work(rq);
}
if (!core_rq)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h
index cd74cc41c8da..acf187c36fc4 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
@@ -1063,6 +1063,8 @@ struct rq {
unsigned int core_enabled;
unsigned int core_sched_seq;
struct rb_root core_tree;
+ struct irq_work core_irq_work; /* To force HT into kernel */
+ unsigned int core_this_unsafe_nest;
/* shared state */
unsigned int core_task_seq;
@@ -1070,6 +1072,7 @@ struct rq {
unsigned long core_cookie;
unsigned char core_forceidle;
unsigned int core_forceidle_seq;
+ unsigned int core_unsafe_nest;
#endif
};
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