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Message-Id: <160564731624.1001615.8892910904546455542.b4-ty@chromium.org>
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 13:08:45 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Fix misuse of security_capable()
On Fri, 30 Oct 2020 13:38:47 +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This series replaces all the use of security_capable(current_cred(),
> ...) with ns_capable{,_noaudit}() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.
>
> This initially come from a review of Landlock by Jann Horn:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1FQVkt78129WozBwFbVhAPyAr9oJAHFHAbbNxEBr9h1g@mail.gmail.com/
>
> Mickaël Salaün (2):
> ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
> seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
>
> [...]
Applied to for-linus/seccomp, thanks!
[1/2] ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/cf23705244c9
[2/2] seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/fb14528e4436
--
Kees Cook
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