linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 0/9] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring

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Date:   Wed, 2 Dec 2020 18:44:17 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To:     Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc:     David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/9] Enable root to update the blacklist keyring

On Mon, Nov 30, 2020 at 09:23:59AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> 
> On 30/11/2020 03:40, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 20, 2020 at 07:04:17PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> This patch series mainly add a new configuration option to enable the
> >> root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring.  This keyring is
> >> useful to "untrust" certificates or files.  Enabling to safely update
> >> this keyring without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
> > 
> > I apologize for latency. This cycle has been difficult because of
> > final cuts with the huge SGX patch set.
> > 
> > I did skim through this and did not see anything striking (but it
> > was a quick look).
> > 
> > What would be easiest way to smoke test the changes?
> 
> An easy way to test it is to enable the second trusted keyring to
> dynamically load certificates in the kernel. Then we can create a hash
> of a valid certificate (but not loaded yet) and sign it as explained in
> tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh (patch 9/9). Once this hash is loaded
> in the kernel, loading the blacklisted certificate will be denied. We
> can also test it with a PKCS#7 signature chain, either with the
> blacklist keyring itself, or with a signed dm-verity image.

Thanks, looking into this once 5.11-rc1 is out.

/Jarkko