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Message-Id: <20201209222320.1724-6-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 14:22:59 -0800
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To: x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH v16 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces these MSRs:
MSR_IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP (Privilege Level 1 shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP (Privilege Level 2 shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_S_CET (kernel-mode CET settings),
MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB (exception shadow stack table).
The two user-mode MSRs belong to XFEATURE_CET_USER. The first three of
kernel-mode MSRs belong to XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL. Both XSAVES states are
supervisor states.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 ++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 10 +++++++++-
4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
index f5a38a5f3ae1..035eb0ec665e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ enum xfeature {
XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
XFEATURE_PKRU,
XFEATURE_PASID,
- XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11,
- XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_12,
+ XFEATURE_CET_USER,
+ XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL,
XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13,
XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14,
XFEATURE_LBR,
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ enum xfeature {
#define XFEATURE_MASK_PT (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID (1 << XFEATURE_PASID)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER (1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR (1 << XFEATURE_LBR)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
@@ -237,6 +239,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
u32 pad;
} __packed;
+/*
+ * State component 11 is Control-flow Enforcement user states
+ */
+struct cet_user_state {
+ u64 user_cet; /* user control-flow settings */
+ u64 user_ssp; /* user shadow stack pointer */
+};
+
+/*
+ * State component 12 is Control-flow Enforcement kernel states
+ */
+struct cet_kernel_state {
+ u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */
+ u64 pl1_ssp; /* privilege level 1 shadow stack */
+ u64 pl2_ssp; /* privilege level 2 shadow stack */
+};
+
/*
* State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state.
* The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
index 47a92232d595..582f3575e0bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@
XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
/* All currently supported supervisor features */
-#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)
/*
* A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@
* Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is
* supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask.
*/
-#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
/* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */
#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 972a34d93505..74b2f6081ea2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -922,4 +922,23 @@
#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115
#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117
+/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
+#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x6a0 /* user mode cet setting */
+#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x6a2 /* kernel mode cet setting */
+#define CET_SHSTK_EN BIT_ULL(0)
+#define CET_WRSS_EN BIT_ULL(1)
+#define CET_ENDBR_EN BIT_ULL(2)
+#define CET_LEG_IW_EN BIT_ULL(3)
+#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN BIT_ULL(4)
+#define CET_SUPPRESS_DISABLE BIT_ULL(5)
+#define CET_RESERVED (BIT_ULL(6) | BIT_ULL(7) | BIT_ULL(8) | BIT_ULL(9))
+#define CET_SUPPRESS BIT_ULL(10)
+#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR BIT_ULL(11)
+
+#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x6a4 /* kernel shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x6a5 /* ring-1 shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x6a6 /* ring-2 shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x6a7 /* user shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x6a8 /* exception shadow stack table */
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 5d8047441a0a..22eedf8066bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
"Processor Trace (unused)" ,
"Protection Keys User registers",
"PASID state",
+ "Control-flow User registers" ,
+ "Control-flow Kernel registers" ,
"unknown xstate feature" ,
};
@@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
X86_FEATURE_PKU,
X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
+ X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_USER */
+ X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */
};
/*
@@ -321,6 +325,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)
print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM);
print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PASID);
+ print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER);
+ print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL);
}
/*
@@ -596,6 +602,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, struct avx_512_hi16_state);
XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU, struct pkru_state);
XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PASID, struct ia32_pasid_state);
+ XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_USER, struct cet_user_state);
+ XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state);
/*
* Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if
@@ -605,7 +613,7 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
if ((nr < XFEATURE_YMM) ||
(nr >= XFEATURE_MAX) ||
(nr == XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR) ||
- ((nr >= XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11) && (nr <= XFEATURE_LBR))) {
+ ((nr >= XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13) && (nr <= XFEATURE_LBR))) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "no structure for xstate: %d\n", nr);
XSTATE_WARN_ON(1);
}
--
2.21.0
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