linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v16 02/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection

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Date:   Tue, 29 Dec 2020 13:39:10 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 02/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for
 user-mode control-flow protection

On Wed, Dec 09, 2020 at 02:22:56PM -0800, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
> corruption.  It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
> CONFIG_X86_CET_USER, and the application is built for the feature.
		     ^
		   enabled.

> This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel.  When it is enabled, legacy
> non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/Kconfig           | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler |  5 +++++
>  2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

Rest looks good, thanks.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette