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Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2020 01:00:37 +0000 From: "Bae, Chang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com> To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, "herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>, "Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>, "Sun, Ning" <ning.sun@...el.com>, "Dwarakanath, Kumar N" <kumar.n.dwarakanath@...el.com>, "linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-pm@...r.kernel.org" <linux-pm@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 4/8] x86/power: Restore Key Locker internal key from the ACPI S3/4 sleep states > On Dec 18, 2020, at 04:10, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 16, 2020 at 09:41:42AM -0800, Chang S. Bae wrote: >> When the system state switches to these sleep states, the internal key gets >> reset. Since this system transition is transparent to userspace, the >> internal key needs to be restored properly. >> >> Key Locker provides a mechanism to back up the internal key in non-volatile >> memory. The kernel requests a backup right after the key loaded at >> boot-time and copies it later when the system wakes up. >> >> The backup during the S5 sleep state is not trusted. It is overwritten by a >> new key at the next boot. >> >> On a system with the S3/4 states, enable the feature only when the backup >> mechanism is supported. >> >> Disable the feature when the copy fails (or the backup corrupts). The >> shutdown is considered too noisy. A new key is considerable only when >> threads can be synchronously suspended. > > Can this backup key be used to decrypt the encoded AES keys without executing > the keylocker instructions on the same CPU? No. The backup key itself is inaccessible to the software. Thanks, Chang
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