[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <e61c46f2ded9d8676c77beb40c78200df0ada928.camel@chronox.de>
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 16:22:22 +0100
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@...e.cz>
Cc: Torsten Duwe <duwe@....de>,
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>,
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Vito Caputo <vcaputo@...garu.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>,
Peter Matthias <matthias.peter@....bund.de>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...ia.fr>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
And y Lavr <andy.lavr@...il.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, simo@...hat.com
Subject: Re: drivers/char/random.c needs a (new) maintainer
Am Mittwoch, dem 23.12.2020 um 15:32 +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
>
> I would, however, be interested in a keccak-based construction. But
> just using the keccak permutation does not automatically make it
> "SHA-3", so we're back at the same issue again. FIPS is simply not
> interesting for our requirements.
Your requirements? Interesting approach.
Using non-assessed cryptography? Sounds dangerous to me even though it may be
based on some well-known construction.
I thought Linux in general and crypto in particular is about allowing user (or
the vendor) to decide about the used algorithm. So, let us have a mechanism
that gives them this freedom.
Thus the proposed idea sounds to me like a dangerous proposition upon which
almost all cryptography shall rest. This will surely invite even more
fragmentation.
Ciao
Stephan
PS: This entire discussion is NOT about the crypto side of the random numbers,
but about how get the entropy for the random numbers.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists