[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAHmME9p266FpLENSH+HvZ_G_uEM8O_L-MDDTMRBxFms7zqM5tQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 16:33:03 +0100
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@...e.cz>, Torsten Duwe <duwe@....de>,
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>,
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Vito Caputo <vcaputo@...garu.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>,
Peter Matthias <matthias.peter@....bund.de>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...ia.fr>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
And y Lavr <andy.lavr@...il.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, simo@...hat.com
Subject: Re: drivers/char/random.c needs a (new) maintainer
On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 4:26 PM Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de> wrote:
>
> Am Mittwoch, dem 23.12.2020 um 15:32 +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> >
> > I would, however, be interested in a keccak-based construction. But
> > just using the keccak permutation does not automatically make it
> > "SHA-3", so we're back at the same issue again. FIPS is simply not
> > interesting for our requirements.
>
> Using non-assessed cryptography? Sounds dangerous to me even though it may be
> based on some well-known construction.
"assessed" is not necessarily the same as FIPS. Don't conflate the
two. I don't appreciate that kind of dishonest argumentation.
And new constructions that I'm interested in would be formally
verified (like the other crypto work I've done) with review and buy-in
from the cryptographic community, both engineering and academic. I
have no interest in submitting "non-assessed" things developed in a
vacuum, and I'm displeased with your attempting to make that
characterization.
Similarly, any other new design proposed I would expect a similar
amount of rigor. The current RNG is admittedly a bit of a mess, but at
least it's a design that's evolved. Something that's "revolutionary",
rather than evolutionary, needs considerably more argumentation.
So, please, don't strawman this into the "non-assessed" rhetoric.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists