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Message-ID: <f7fb8383-6bec-3982-7526-f9ea7ab3673f@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 09:47:04 -0600
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: Babu Moger <babu.moger@....com>, pbonzini@...hat.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de
Cc: fenghua.yu@...el.com, tony.luck@...el.com, wanpengli@...cent.com,
kvm@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org, seanjc@...gle.com,
joro@...tes.org, x86@...nel.org, kyung.min.park@...el.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, krish.sadhukhan@...cle.com,
hpa@...or.com, mgross@...ux.intel.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
kim.phillips@....com, wei.huang2@....com, jmattson@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: SVM: Add support for Virtual SPEC_CTRL
On 12/22/20 4:31 PM, Babu Moger wrote:
> Newer AMD processors have a feature to virtualize the use of the
> SPEC_CTRL MSR. A hypervisor may wish to impose speculation controls on
> guest execution or a guest may want to impose its own speculation
> controls. Therefore, the processor implements both host and guest
> versions of SPEC_CTRL. Presence of this feature is indicated via CPUID
> function 0x8000000A_EDX[20]: GuestSpecCtrl. Hypervisors are not
> required to enable this feature since it is automatically enabled on
> processors that support it.
>
> When in host mode, the host SPEC_CTRL value is in effect and writes
> update only the host version of SPEC_CTRL. On a VMRUN, the processor
> loads the guest version of SPEC_CTRL from the VMCB. When the guest
> writes SPEC_CTRL, only the guest version is updated. On a VMEXIT,
> the guest version is saved into the VMCB and the processor returns
> to only using the host SPEC_CTRL for speculation control. The guest
> SPEC_CTRL is located at offset 0x2E0 in the VMCB.
With the SEV-ES hypervisor support now in the tree, this will need to add
support in sev_es_sync_vmsa() to put the initial svm->spec_ctrl value in
the SEV-ES VMSA.
>
> The effective SPEC_CTRL setting is the guest SPEC_CTRL setting or'ed
> with the hypervisor SPEC_CTRL setting. This allows the hypervisor to
> ensure a minimum SPEC_CTRL if desired.
>
> This support also fixes an issue where a guest may sometimes see an
> inconsistent value for the SPEC_CTRL MSR on processors that support
> this feature. With the current SPEC_CTRL support, the first write to
> SPEC_CTRL is intercepted and the virtualized version of the SPEC_CTRL
> MSR is not updated. When the guest reads back the SPEC_CTRL MSR, it
> will be 0x0, instead of the actual expected value. There isn’t a
> security concern here, because the host SPEC_CTRL value is or’ed with
> the Guest SPEC_CTRL value to generate the effective SPEC_CTRL value.
> KVM writes with the guest's virtualized SPEC_CTRL value to SPEC_CTRL
> MSR just before the VMRUN, so it will always have the actual value
> even though it doesn’t appear that way in the guest. The guest will
> only see the proper value for the SPEC_CTRL register if the guest was
> to write to the SPEC_CTRL register again. With Virtual SPEC_CTRL
> support, the MSR interception of SPEC_CTRL is disabled during
> vmcb_init, so this will no longer be an issue.
>
> Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 4 +++-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> index 71d630bb5e08..753b25db427c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> @@ -248,12 +248,14 @@ struct vmcb_save_area {
> u64 br_to;
> u64 last_excp_from;
> u64 last_excp_to;
> + u8 reserved_12[72];
> + u32 spec_ctrl; /* Guest version of SPEC_CTRL at 0x2E0 */
>
> /*
> * The following part of the save area is valid only for
> * SEV-ES guests when referenced through the GHCB.
> */
> - u8 reserved_7[104];
> + u8 reserved_7[28];
> u64 reserved_8; /* rax already available at 0x01f8 */
> u64 rcx;
> u64 rdx;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 79b3a564f1c9..6d3db3e8cdfe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1230,6 +1230,16 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>
> svm_check_invpcid(svm);
>
> + /*
> + * If the host supports V_SPEC_CTRL then disable the interception
> + * of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.
> + */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL)) {
> + save->spec_ctrl = svm->spec_ctrl;
> + set_msr_interception(&svm->vcpu, svm->msrpm,
> + MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
> + }
> +
I thought Jim's feedback was to keep the support as originally coded with
respect to the MSR intercept and only update the svm_vcpu_run() to either
read/write the MSR or read/write the save area value based on the feature.
So I think this can be removed.
> if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&svm->vcpu))
> avic_init_vmcb(svm);
>
> @@ -2549,7 +2559,10 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
> return 1;
>
> - msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
> + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
> + else
> + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
This is unneeded since svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl is saved in
svm->spec_ctrl on VMEXIT.
> break;
> case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
> if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> @@ -2640,6 +2653,8 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
> return 1;
>
> svm->spec_ctrl = data;
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
> + svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = data;
And this is unneeded since svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl is set to
svm->spec_ctrl before VMRUN.
> if (!data)
> break;
>
> @@ -3590,7 +3605,10 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
> * being speculatively taken.
> */
> - x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
> + svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = svm->spec_ctrl;
> + else
> + x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
>
> svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, svm);
>
> @@ -3609,12 +3627,15 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
> * save it.
> */
> - if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
> + svm->spec_ctrl = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
> + else if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
> svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
If I understood Jim's feedback correctly, this will change to something like:
if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) {
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
svm->spec_ctrl = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
else
svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
}
Thanks,
Tom
>
> reload_tss(vcpu);
>
> - x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
> + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
> + x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
>
> vcpu->arch.cr2 = svm->vmcb->save.cr2;
> vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = svm->vmcb->save.rax;
>
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