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Message-ID: <365cb250-47e0-a81e-434a-b776889853ad@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 15:37:20 +0100
From: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@...il.com>
To: Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@...hat.com>,
Mark Gross <mgross@...ux.intel.com>,
platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: platform/surface: Add Surface Aggregator user-space interface
(static analysis issues)
On 1/11/21 3:11 PM, Colin Ian King wrote:
> On 11/01/2021 13:55, Maximilian Luz wrote:
>> On 1/11/21 1:12 PM, Colin Ian King wrote:
>>> Hi Maximilian,
>>>
>>> Static analysis of linux-next with Coverity has found several issues
>>> with the following commit:
>>>
>>> commit 178f6ab77e617c984d6520b92e747075a12676ff
>>> Author: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@...il.com>
>>> Date: Mon Dec 21 19:39:58 2020 +0100
>>>
>>> platform/surface: Add Surface Aggregator user-space interface
>>>
>>> The analysis is as follows:
>>>
>>> 65static long ssam_cdev_request(struct ssam_cdev *cdev, unsigned long
>>> arg)
>>> 66{
>>> 67 struct ssam_cdev_request __user *r;
>>> 68 struct ssam_cdev_request rqst;
>>>
>>> 1. var_decl: Declaring variable spec without initializer.
>>>
>>> 69 struct ssam_request spec;
>>> 70 struct ssam_response rsp;
>>> 71 const void __user *plddata;
>>> 72 void __user *rspdata;
>>> 73 int status = 0, ret = 0, tmp;
>>> 74
>>> 75 r = (struct ssam_cdev_request __user *)arg;
>>> 76 ret = copy_struct_from_user(&rqst, sizeof(rqst), r,
>>> sizeof(*r));
>>>
>>> 2. Condition ret, taking true branch.
>>>
>>> 77 if (ret)
>>>
>>> 3. Jumping to label out.
>>>
>>> 78 goto out;
>>>
>>> 79
>>> 80 plddata = u64_to_user_ptr(rqst.payload.data);
>>> 81 rspdata = u64_to_user_ptr(rqst.response.data);
>>> 82
>>> 83 /* Setup basic request fields. */
>>> 84 spec.target_category = rqst.target_category;
>>> 85 spec.target_id = rqst.target_id;
>>> 86 spec.command_id = rqst.command_id;
>>> 87 spec.instance_id = rqst.instance_id;
>>> 88 spec.flags = 0;
>>> 89 spec.length = rqst.payload.length;
>>> 90 spec.payload = NULL;
>>> 91
>>> 92 if (rqst.flags & SSAM_CDEV_REQUEST_HAS_RESPONSE)
>>> 93 spec.flags |= SSAM_REQUEST_HAS_RESPONSE;
>>> 94
>>> 95 if (rqst.flags & SSAM_CDEV_REQUEST_UNSEQUENCED)
>>> 96 spec.flags |= SSAM_REQUEST_UNSEQUENCED;
>>> 97
>>> 98 rsp.capacity = rqst.response.length;
>>> 99 rsp.length = 0;
>>> 100 rsp.pointer = NULL;
>>> 101
>>> 102 /* Get request payload from user-space. */
>>> 103 if (spec.length) {
>>> 104 if (!plddata) {
>>> 105 ret = -EINVAL;
>>> 106 goto out;
>>> 107 }
>>> 108
>>>
>>> CID: Untrusted allocation size (TAINTED_SCALAR)
>>> 8. tainted_data: Passing tainted expression spec.length to kzalloc,
>>> which uses it as an allocation size
>>>
>>> 109 spec.payload = kzalloc(spec.length, GFP_KERNEL);
>>
>> I assume a constraint on the maximum length will fix this?
>
> I believe so, it's unsigned so just an upper size check will be required
> to silence this static analysis warning. Mind you, you may want a size
> that is the full u16 max of 65535, so in that case the check is not
> required.
Right, the theoretical maximum payload (spec.length) and response size
allowed by the Surface Aggregator SSH protocol is 'U16_MAX -
sizeof(struct ssh_command)' (not that anything this size should ever be
allocated in any normal case). Meaning it is (slightly) smaller than
U16_MAX, but I'm not sure if it warrants a check here. The payload size
is later validated by ssam_request_sync(), so it does only affect the
allocation here (the response is just an output buffer and may be of
arbitrary size).
I think the limit imposed by having u16 as user-input should be enough.
I can still add an explicit check here if that is preferred, but I could
also add a comment explaining that this should be safe.
>
>>
>>> 110 if (!spec.payload) {
>>> 111 ret = -ENOMEM;
>>> 112 goto out;
>>> 113 }
>>> 114
>>> 115 if (copy_from_user((void *)spec.payload, plddata,
>>> spec.length)) {
>>> 116 ret = -EFAULT;
>>> 117 goto out;
>>> 118 }
>>> 119 }
>>> 120
>>> 121 /* Allocate response buffer. */
>>> 122 if (rsp.capacity) {
>>> 123 if (!rspdata) {
>>> 124 ret = -EINVAL;
>>> 125 goto out;
>>> 126 }
>>> 127
>>>
>>> CID: Untrusted allocation size (TAINTED_SCALAR)
>>> 12. tainted_data: Passing tainted expression rsp.capacity to kzalloc,
>>> which uses it as an allocation size
>>>
>>> 128 rsp.pointer = kzalloc(rsp.capacity, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> 129 if (!rsp.pointer) {
>>> 130 ret = -ENOMEM;
>>> 131 goto out;
>>> 132 }
>>> 133 }
>>> 134
>>> 135 /* Perform request. */
>>> 136 status = ssam_request_sync(cdev->ctrl, &spec, &rsp);
>>> 137 if (status)
>>> 138 goto out;
>>> 139
>>> 140 /* Copy response to user-space. */
>>> 141 if (rsp.length && copy_to_user(rspdata, rsp.pointer,
>>> rsp.length))
>>> 142 ret = -EFAULT;
>>> 143
>>> 144out:
>>> 145 /* Always try to set response-length and status. */
>>>
>>> CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>>> Using uninitialized value rsp.length
>>>
>>> 146 tmp = put_user(rsp.length, &r->response.length);
>>>
>>> 4. Condition tmp, taking true branch.
>>>
>>> 147 if (tmp)
>>> 148 ret = tmp;
>>> 149
>>> 150 tmp = put_user(status, &r->status);
>>>
>>> 5. Condition tmp, taking true branch.
>>>
>>> 151 if (tmp)
>>> 152 ret = tmp;
>>> 153
>>> 154 /* Cleanup. */
>>>
>>> CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>>> 6. uninit_use_in_call: Using uninitialized value spec.payload when
>>> calling kfree.
>>>
>>> 155 kfree(spec.payload);
>>>
>>> CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>>> uninit_use_in_call: Using uninitialized value rsp.pointer when
>>> calling kfree
>>>
>>> 156 kfree(rsp.pointer);
>>
>> Right, taking the first jump to out leaves rsp and spec uninitialized.
>> I'll fix that.
>>
>>> 157
>>> 158 return ret;
>>>
>>> Colin
>>>
>>
>> Thank you for the analysis. I'll draft up two patches to address these
>> issues.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Max
>
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