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Message-ID: <789297d3-57dd-a374-da94-549b43a3305b@canonical.com>
Date:   Mon, 11 Jan 2021 14:45:10 +0000
From:   Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>
To:     Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@...il.com>
Cc:     Hans de Goede <hdegoede@...hat.com>,
        Mark Gross <mgross@...ux.intel.com>,
        platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: platform/surface: Add Surface Aggregator user-space interface
 (static analysis issues)

On 11/01/2021 14:37, Maximilian Luz wrote:
> On 1/11/21 3:11 PM, Colin Ian King wrote:
>> On 11/01/2021 13:55, Maximilian Luz wrote:
>>> On 1/11/21 1:12 PM, Colin Ian King wrote:
>>>> Hi Maximilian,
>>>>
>>>> Static analysis of linux-next with Coverity has found several issues
>>>> with the following commit:
>>>>
>>>> commit 178f6ab77e617c984d6520b92e747075a12676ff
>>>> Author: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@...il.com>
>>>> Date:   Mon Dec 21 19:39:58 2020 +0100
>>>>
>>>>       platform/surface: Add Surface Aggregator user-space interface
>>>>
>>>> The analysis is as follows:
>>>>
>>>> 65static long ssam_cdev_request(struct ssam_cdev *cdev, unsigned long
>>>> arg)
>>>>    66{
>>>>    67        struct ssam_cdev_request __user *r;
>>>>    68        struct ssam_cdev_request rqst;
>>>>
>>>>      1. var_decl: Declaring variable spec without initializer.
>>>>
>>>>    69        struct ssam_request spec;
>>>>    70        struct ssam_response rsp;
>>>>    71        const void __user *plddata;
>>>>    72        void __user *rspdata;
>>>>    73        int status = 0, ret = 0, tmp;
>>>>    74
>>>>    75        r = (struct ssam_cdev_request __user *)arg;
>>>>    76        ret = copy_struct_from_user(&rqst, sizeof(rqst), r,
>>>> sizeof(*r));
>>>>
>>>>      2. Condition ret, taking true branch.
>>>>
>>>>    77        if (ret)
>>>>
>>>>      3. Jumping to label out.
>>>>
>>>>    78                goto out;
>>>>
>>>>    79
>>>>    80        plddata = u64_to_user_ptr(rqst.payload.data);
>>>>    81        rspdata = u64_to_user_ptr(rqst.response.data);
>>>>    82
>>>>    83        /* Setup basic request fields. */
>>>>    84        spec.target_category = rqst.target_category;
>>>>    85        spec.target_id = rqst.target_id;
>>>>    86        spec.command_id = rqst.command_id;
>>>>    87        spec.instance_id = rqst.instance_id;
>>>>    88        spec.flags = 0;
>>>>    89        spec.length = rqst.payload.length;
>>>>    90        spec.payload = NULL;
>>>>    91
>>>>    92        if (rqst.flags & SSAM_CDEV_REQUEST_HAS_RESPONSE)
>>>>    93                spec.flags |= SSAM_REQUEST_HAS_RESPONSE;
>>>>    94
>>>>    95        if (rqst.flags & SSAM_CDEV_REQUEST_UNSEQUENCED)
>>>>    96                spec.flags |= SSAM_REQUEST_UNSEQUENCED;
>>>>    97
>>>>    98        rsp.capacity = rqst.response.length;
>>>>    99        rsp.length = 0;
>>>> 100        rsp.pointer = NULL;
>>>> 101
>>>> 102        /* Get request payload from user-space. */
>>>> 103        if (spec.length) {
>>>> 104                if (!plddata) {
>>>> 105                        ret = -EINVAL;
>>>> 106                        goto out;
>>>> 107                }
>>>> 108
>>>>
>>>> CID: Untrusted allocation size (TAINTED_SCALAR)
>>>>      8. tainted_data: Passing tainted expression spec.length to
>>>> kzalloc,
>>>> which uses it as an allocation size
>>>>
>>>> 109                spec.payload = kzalloc(spec.length, GFP_KERNEL);
>>>
>>> I assume a constraint on the maximum length will fix this?
>>
>> I believe so, it's unsigned so just an upper size check will be required
>> to silence this static analysis warning. Mind you, you may want a size
>> that is the full u16 max of 65535, so in that case the check is not
>> required.
> 
> Right, the theoretical maximum payload (spec.length) and response size
> allowed by the Surface Aggregator SSH protocol is 'U16_MAX -
> sizeof(struct ssh_command)' (not that anything this size should ever be
> allocated in any normal case). Meaning it is (slightly) smaller than
> U16_MAX, but I'm not sure if it warrants a check here. The payload size
> is later validated by ssam_request_sync(), so it does only affect the
> allocation here (the response is just an output buffer and may be of
> arbitrary size).
> 
> I think the limit imposed by having u16 as user-input should be enough.

Sounds good to me.

> I can still add an explicit check here if that is preferred, but I could
> also add a comment explaining that this should be safe.

If that's not too much trouble, that could be useful for folks later on
who look at this.

> 
>>
>>>
>>>> 110                if (!spec.payload) {
>>>> 111                        ret = -ENOMEM;
>>>> 112                        goto out;
>>>> 113                }
>>>> 114
>>>> 115                if (copy_from_user((void *)spec.payload, plddata,
>>>> spec.length)) {
>>>> 116                        ret = -EFAULT;
>>>> 117                        goto out;
>>>> 118                }
>>>> 119        }
>>>> 120
>>>> 121        /* Allocate response buffer. */
>>>> 122        if (rsp.capacity) {
>>>> 123                if (!rspdata) {
>>>> 124                        ret = -EINVAL;
>>>> 125                        goto out;
>>>> 126                }
>>>> 127
>>>>
>>>> CID: Untrusted allocation size (TAINTED_SCALAR)
>>>>      12. tainted_data: Passing tainted expression rsp.capacity to
>>>> kzalloc,
>>>> which uses it as an allocation size
>>>>
>>>> 128                rsp.pointer = kzalloc(rsp.capacity, GFP_KERNEL);
>>>> 129                if (!rsp.pointer) {
>>>> 130                        ret = -ENOMEM;
>>>> 131                        goto out;
>>>> 132                }
>>>> 133        }
>>>> 134
>>>> 135        /* Perform request. */
>>>> 136        status = ssam_request_sync(cdev->ctrl, &spec, &rsp);
>>>> 137        if (status)
>>>> 138                goto out;
>>>> 139
>>>> 140        /* Copy response to user-space. */
>>>> 141        if (rsp.length && copy_to_user(rspdata, rsp.pointer,
>>>> rsp.length))
>>>> 142                ret = -EFAULT;
>>>> 143
>>>> 144out:
>>>> 145        /* Always try to set response-length and status. */
>>>>
>>>>      CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>>>>      Using uninitialized value rsp.length
>>>>
>>>> 146        tmp = put_user(rsp.length, &r->response.length);
>>>>
>>>>      4. Condition tmp, taking true branch.
>>>>
>>>> 147        if (tmp)
>>>> 148                ret = tmp;
>>>> 149
>>>> 150        tmp = put_user(status, &r->status);
>>>>
>>>>      5. Condition tmp, taking true branch.
>>>>
>>>> 151        if (tmp)
>>>> 152                ret = tmp;
>>>> 153
>>>> 154        /* Cleanup. */
>>>>
>>>>      CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>>>>      6. uninit_use_in_call: Using uninitialized value spec.payload when
>>>> calling kfree.
>>>>
>>>> 155        kfree(spec.payload);
>>>>
>>>>      CID: Uninitialized pointer read (UNINIT)
>>>>      uninit_use_in_call: Using uninitialized value rsp.pointer when
>>>> calling kfree
>>>>
>>>> 156        kfree(rsp.pointer);
>>>
>>> Right, taking the first jump to out leaves rsp and spec uninitialized.
>>> I'll fix that.
>>>
>>>> 157
>>>> 158        return ret;
>>>>
>>>> Colin
>>>>
>>>
>>> Thank you for the analysis. I'll draft up two patches to address these
>>> issues.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Max
>>

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