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Message-ID: <6dc99fd9ffbc5f405c5f64d0802d1399fc6428e4.camel@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2021 19:53:39 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel@...gutronix.de,
jlu@...gutronix.de
Subject: Re: Migration to trusted keys: sealing user-provided key?
On Thu, 2021-01-28 at 18:31 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I've been looking into how a migration to using trusted/encrypted keys
> would look like (particularly with dm-crypt).
>
> Currently, it seems the the only way is to re-encrypt the partitions
> because trusted/encrypted keys always generate their payloads from
> RNG.
>
> If instead there was a key command to initialize a new trusted/encrypted
> key with a user provided value, users could use whatever mechanism they
> used beforehand to get a plaintext key and use that to initialize a new
> trusted/encrypted key. From there on, the key will be like any other
> trusted/encrypted key and not be disclosed again to userspace.
>
> What are your thoughts on this? Would an API like
>
> keyctl add trusted dmcrypt-key 'set <content>' # user-supplied content
>
> be acceptable?
Maybe it's the lack of knowledge with dm-crypt, but why this would be
useful? Just want to understand the bottleneck, that's all.
> Cheers,
> Ahmad
/Jarkko
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